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Against Settlement of (Some)
Patent Cases*
Megan M. La Belle**
For decades now, there has been a pronounced trend in civil litigation
away from adjudication and toward settlement. This settlement phenomenon
has spawned a vast critical literature beginning with Owen Fiss's seminal
work, Against Settlement. Fiss opposes settlement because it achieves peace
rather than justice, and because settlements often are coerced due to power
and resource imbalances between the parties. Other critics have questioned the
role that courts play (or ought to play) in settlement proceedings and have
argued that the secondary effects of settlement -especially the lack of
decisional law-are damaging to our judicial system. Still, despite these
criticisms, settlement remains the norm in civil litigation today.
This Article considers the settlement phenomenon in the context of
patent litigation. In recent years, courts have seen an explosion of patent
litigation. Consistent with the general trend in civil lawsuits, most of those
patent suits have been settled. While scholars have studied and debated
"reverse payment" or "pay for delay" patent settlements in depth, what is
missing from the literature is a comprehensive treatment of the normative
questions raised by the widespread settlement of conventional patent cases. Do
conventional patent settlements necessarilypromote the public good? Should
courts encourage these patent disputes to settle? Are there certain types of
patent cases that should be adjudicated ratherthan settled?
This Article sets out to answer these questions. It begins by
contextualizing the antisettlement arguments of Fiss and other scholars
within the framework of patent litigation. The Article then identifies some of
the unique problems that patent settlements create, namely that settlement
*
The title of this Article pays homage to Owen Fiss's famous essay Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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allows potentially invalid patents to remain in force in contravention of the
public good. Next, the Article canvasses the case law and literature, and it
concludes that the judiciary systematically encourages patent litigants to
settle. The final part of the Article argues that, from a social welfare
perspective, settlement is not the best way to resolve all patent disputes.
Rather, the Article proposes, trial judges should serve as protectors of the
public interest. It then concludes by recommending various factors to inform
the decision whether a particular patent case should be settled or be
adjudicated, and by offering suggestions for how trial courts might influence
outcomes in patent litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many colorful metaphors are used to depict patent litigation.
Some call it the "sport of kings,"' whereas others refer to it as the
"business of sharks."2 The plot of patent litigation includes trolls,
thickets, junk patents, holdups, and turf battles. Patent litigation is
not like other civil litigation, or so the story goes. It is a bet-thecompany endeavor where the parties and their lawyers are at war.
While obviously hyperbolic, the message of this rhetoric is
clear: patent litigation is complex, expensive, and unpredictable. Its
high stakes and high costs mean that patent suits are usually settled
rather than adjudicated to judgment. Studies indicate that somewhere
between 65-68% of patent cases are settled at the district court level,
and more settle on appeal.3 Of the remaining patent cases, a
significant portion are resolved through nonmerit dispositions (such as
jurisdictional dismissals), leaving only about 15% of patent cases
decided on the merits-most of which are summary judgments as
opposed to judgments rendered after trial. 4
That most patent disputes settle is not especially surprising in
light of the precipitous decline in the number of trials in all types of
federal civil litigation over the past fifty years. Today, barely 1% of
federal civil cases are tried by a judge or a jury, as compared to the
1960s, when that number was close to 12%.5 Indeed, even though the
1. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research
on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
2. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in
the Litigationof High-TechPatents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2009).
3. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 272
& n.216, 273-74 (2006) (finding that 65% of patent cases "definitively or probably" settled in
1995 and that 68% of such cases "definitively or probably" settled in 2000); see also Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (estimating that two-thirds of all civil suits settle).
4. Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 273-74.
5. See Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of Civil Trials in
American Courts 3 (2011) (paper presented at Pound Civil Justice Institute 2011 Forum for
State Appellate Court Judges), availableat http://perma.ccfU3J8-U7HD (finding that 11-12% of
federal cases were terminated during or after trial during the 1960s, compared to the 1%of cases
terminated in such a manner in 2010).
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total number of civil matters disposed of by the federal courts has
increased sixfold over this time period,6 there are actually fewer civil
trials now than there were in 1962.7
This shift away from trial and toward settlement has been the
subject of vigorous debate among scholars. Advocates of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") argue that settlement is the preferred
means of disposition because it allows for more flexible and creative
outcomes, and simultaneously saves time and resources for parties
and courts. 8 Settlement critics, the most notable being Owen Fiss,
oppose settlement because it achieves peace rather than justice, is
often coerced, and deprives society of much-needed decisional law. 9
And finally, a third camp of scholars accepts settlement as an
alternative to adjudication but believes the judiciary's role in
settlement should be limited. 10
This Article considers the settlement phenomenon in the
context of patent litigation. The past decade has witnessed an
explosion of patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements.
Concomitant with this rise of patent activity came widespread
discontent with our patent system, culminating in the passage of the
America Invents Act ("AIA")-the most comprehensive patent reform
legislation in more than fifty years." The AIA provides some hoped-for
correctives for various shortcomings of our patent system, including
low patent quality, high litigation costs, and inconsistency with
foreign patent law. 12 What the AIA does not address-and what few
scholars have explored-is how settlement has contributed to the
current crisis of confidence in our patent system. This Article seeks to
fill that gap.
6.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 15 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/DR5V-LLQH,
(indicating that federal courts disposed of 303,158 civil cases in 2011); Marc Galanter, The

Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 459, 462-63 (2004) (indicating that U.S. district courts disposed of 50,320
civil matters in 1962).
7.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 6, at 20 (indicating that there were
5,357 federal civil trials in 2011); Galanter, supra note 6, at 462 (indicating that there were 5,802
federal civil trials in 1962).
8.
See infra Part II.A (discussing positions of settlement advocates).
9.
See infra Part II.B (laying out the antisettlement arguments of Fiss and other scholars).
10. See infra Part II.C (explaining the role of courts in civil settlement).
11. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. (2012)). Another important motivating force behind the AIA was the need
for international harmonization of our patent laws. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty
Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1046 (2012).
12. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (including provisions addressing patent quality,

litigation costs, and inconsistency with foreign patent law).

2014]

AGAINST SOME PATENT SETTLEMENTS

379

To be clear, there is a rich body of scholarship dedicated to
settlement in patent cases. There are empirical studies demonstrating
that most patent cases settle,13 and that certain types of patent cases
are more inclined toward settlement.14 Moreover, the topic of whether
"reverse payment" or "pay for delay" patent settlements violate
antitrust laws has been well mined. 15 But the focus of this Article is
different. It considers and reflects upon the normative questions
raised by conventional patent settlements, in other words, typical
settlements where the accused infringer pays the patent owner to
settle. Specifically, the Article asks whether patent settlements
promote the patent system's purpose of furthering innovation for the
benefit of society,16 or whether the public would be better served by
adjudication in some patent cases.
As a starting point to answer these questions, the Article looks
to the vast critical literature on civil settlement. Mapping the
antisettlement arguments of Fiss and other scholars onto a patentlitigation model leads to the conclusion that many patent settlements
contravene the public good.17 Not only are patent settlements
frequently coerced, they also come at the expense of judicial precedent,
which is particularly valuable in the patent context since an invalidity
judgment estops the patentee from ever asserting that patent again.18
A related concern is that patent settlements may achieve peace
between the parties, but not justice. When patent litigants settle, the

13. Kesan & Ball, supranote 3, at 273-74.
14. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 689 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39-40 (2009) (analyzing these issues); Christopher
M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 493 (2007) (analyzing the antitrust implications of reverse
payment settlements); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2003) (suggesting a "way to reconcile the
interests of IP law and antitrust law in evaluating IP settlements"). Given that the Supreme
Court decided its first case involving a reverse payment just last year, see FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013), scholars will continue to explore this subject for the foreseeable
future. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme
Court's Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. Scl. & TECH. 3, 3 (2014) (discussing the breadth of the
Actavis opinion); Michael A. Carrier, The U.S. Supreme Court Issues First Ruling on Antitrust
Liability of Reverse-Payment Drug Patent Settlements (Actavis), E-COMPETITIONS BULL., July 17,
2013, at 1, available at http://perma.cc/PH6B-CP28 (analyzing the Actavis opinion).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See infra Part IV (contextualizing antisettlement arguments within a patent litigation
framework).
18. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding
that, once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent owner from
ever asserting it again).
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accused infringer usually agrees to pay the patent owner, stipulates to
the patent's validity, and promises not to challenge the patent in the
future. 9 Even assuming such an agreement is in the best interests of
the parties, it may undermine the public's interest by allowing a
potentially invalid patent to remain intact. 20
Yet despite these social welfare implications, courts at all
levels encourage settlement of patent litigation. Courts achieve this
through several means: individual trial judges pressure parties to
settle, courts order parties to mandatory settlement conferences, and
the Federal Circuit has developed a prosettlement jurisprudence that
permeates the patent law. 2 1 Like ADR advocates, courts contend that
settlement is the best way to resolve patent litigation because it
promotes the public good by conserving valuable judicial time and
resources.22
The answer to the question whether patent settlements serve
the public interest, I believe, lies somewhere between these two
positions. This Article therefore suggests that certain patent cases
should be settled while others should be adjudicated to judgment. 23 I
argue, in other words, "against settlement" of some patent cases. Of
course, this sort of proposal raises obvious questions. Which patent
cases should fall into the settlement camp and which should be
adjudicated? Who should decide? How can private parties be
prevented from settling a dispute? And even assuming some parties
were forced to litigate, would the benefits really outweigh the costs?
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part II considers the
vanishing of trials and the rise of settlement as the predominant
means for resolving civil litigation in our federal courts. It introduces
the long-running debate among scholars about the relative values of
settlement and adjudication, highlighting Owen Fiss's famous essay
Against Settlement. 24 This Part concludes with a discussion of the
federal judge's evolving role from passive arbiter to case manager,
19. See infra Part V.C (summarizing Federal Circuit case law that allows patent owners to
force accused infringers to agree to "no-challenge" provisions in settlement agreements).
20. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition:A Proposal and a Comparison to
the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105 (2011) ("Inventions covered by valid
patents could foster innovation. In contrast, invalid patents threaten to increase prices and limit
competition without any countervailing benefits.").
21. See infra Part V (noting different steps courts have taken to foster patent settlements).
22. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearanceof Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 560 (2012) (discussing the role of "caseload pressures" in judicial promotion of

settlement).
23. See infra Part VI (proposing that the trial judge act as protector of the public interest in
deciding which patent cases should settle and which should be adjudicated).
24. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984).
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noting concerns about judges who actively encourage-or sometimes
even pressure-parties to settle. 25
Part III turns to patents and surveys the landscape regarding
patent litigation outcomes. After documenting the proliferation of
patent litigation in the past decade or so, this Part summarizes
various empirical data about how patent cases are resolved. Focusing
on two particular studies, a number of conclusions are drawn. First,
the vast majority of patent suits settle, whereas only a small
percentage of cases proceed to trial. 26 Second, the patent cases most
likely to settle involve the most litigated patents, defined as having
been the subject of eight or more lawsuits. 27 Finally, and most
relevant to the thesis of this Article, when cases involving the most
litigated patents are adjudicated rather than settled, the patents are
very likely to be invalidated. 28
With these statistics in mind, Part IV explores the normative
implications of the patent settlement phenomenon. It begins with the
unremarkable proposition that the public is the intended primary
beneficiary of the patent system, as the Constitution itself
contemplates. 29 Part IV then contextualizes the antisettlement
arguments of Fiss and other scholars within a patent litigation
framework to evaluate whether patent settlements promote the public
good. Considered from this social welfare perspective, settlement is
not always the best way to resolve patent disputes because, among
other reasons, it allows potentially invalid patents to remain in force.30
Part V turns to the role of the judiciary in patent settlements.
Although certain patent settlements contravene the public interest, all
evidence indicates that there is a strong judicial bias toward
settlement of patent cases. 31 This Part explains why courts prefer
patent cases to settle, and it catalogues the various mechanisms
courts use to facilitate settlement outcomes. 32 Above all, it emphasizes
the Federal Circuit's prosettlement case law, which infiltrates
25. See infra Part II.C (discussing different approaches that federal courts take to
settlement).
26. Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 272-74.
27. Allison et al., supra note 14, at 682, 689.
28. Id. at 687.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that patents are to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts").
30. See infra Part IV (concluding that patent settlements create societal problems
specifically by allowing potentially invalid patents to remain in force).

31.

See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We

Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 753 (2011) (noting courts' "strong preference that
intellectual property disputes be settled").
32. See infra Part IV (noting various means used by courts to achieve patent settlements).
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doctrines ostensibly unrelated to patent law, including personal
jurisdiction and discovery. 33 With this jurisprudential backdrop in
place, it is the rare district judge who questions whether settlement of
a particular patent case serves the public interest.
Part VI sets out a proposal for more adjudication and less
settlement of patent cases. It argues that adjudication of certain types
of patent cases will promote the public good by eradicating invalid
patents. To that end, it suggests that, in patent litigation, trial judges
serve as protectors of the public interest. Trial judges are well suited
for this role because they regularly consider the public interest in
deciding other patent law issues, such as whether to grant injunctive
relief.34 Next, this Part identifies three classes of patent suits that
ought to be adjudicated rather than settled and then lays out some
suggestions for how trial judges might encourage parties to litigate
appropriate patent cases. These suggestions range from the modest
(e.g., courts should stop pressuring patent litigants to settle) to
the somewhat radical (e.g., courts could treat patent suits as
"quasi-class actions," thereby requiring court approval of any
settlement agreement). This is not intended as an exhaustive list, but
it provides courts with ideas for influencing litigation outcomes.
Finally, Part VII anticipates potential objections to this
Article's proposal-namely, that encouraging adjudication of patent
suits will increase the workload for our already overburdened federal
courts. While I concede that may be true in the short term, the long
term effects of my proposal will actually reduce patent litigation in
federal courts.
II. CIVIL LITIGATION AND THE SETTLEMENT PHENOMENON
Historically, civil suits filed in federal court often ended with a
trial. The 1980s marked the beginning of a sea change, however, and
now federal civil trials are exceedingly rare. 35 While some of these
untried cases are resolved through pretrial motions, the vast majority
are settled out of court. Settlement advocates praise this trend
because it not only saves money, time, and resources but also avoids
33. See In re MSTG, Inc., 675 F.3d 1337, 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that decision
whether settlement negotiations are discoverable must take into account the policy of
encouraging settlements); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355,
1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that sending cease-and-desist letters to a forum state does not
subject patent owner to personal jurisdiction because a contrary rule would deter settlement of
patent disputes).
34. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (including public
interest as a factor to consider in deciding whether to grant permanent injunction).
35. Galanter, supra note 6, at 462.
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the dichotomy between winners and losers created by adjudication.36
Yet from the beginning, critics like Owen Fiss have viewed this
settlement phenomenon "as an evil, in social justice terms," 37 because
it favors parties with greater resources and achieves peace instead of
justice.38
A. The "Vanishing Trial"39
As a society, we tend to think of trial as the paradigm for civil
dispute resolution. 40 Aggrieved individuals go to court and ask a
neutral arbiter to decide whether they were wronged and if some sort
of relief is justified. To that end, a trial is held where evidence is
presented, the truth is revealed, a verdict is rendered, and justice is
served.41
There was a time when this paradigm better reflected realitywhen a good number of tort, contract, and civil rights disputes were
resolved by trial. 42 But that is no longer true. In 1962, federal courts
conducted 5,802 civil trials (including both jury and bench trials),
which constituted 11.5% of all dispositions. 43 Within just twenty years,
however, that number was cut almost in half, with only 6.1% of cases
ending in a trial.44 And today, civil trials have all but disappeared,
with federal courts disposing of barely 1% of all civil cases through
trial.45 So what is the explanation for this dramatic decline?
One reason civil trials are vanishing is because federal courts
are much more likely to dispose of suits through pretrial motions than
36. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522-23
(2007).
37. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and
Opportunities,27 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1, 6 (2012).
38. Fiss, supra note 24, at 1075-76.
39. Galanter, supra note 6, at 459.
40. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 (1991).
41. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1341 ("The popular wisdom about civil justice
perceives courts as resolving cases by adjudication . . . ."); David P. Leonard, The Use of
Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1986) (discussing "society's dominant paradigm of the modern trial, the paradigm of
rational truth-seeking").
42. Galanter, supra note 6, at 462-63. In 1936, one-fifth of all federal civil cases were
resolved through trial. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 633 n.3 (discussing a 19% rate during 1936).
43. Galanter, supra note 6, at 462. Although state court trials are also in sharp decline, this
Article will focus on the phenomenon in federal court because federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over patent disputes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
44. Galanter, supra note 6, at 417.
45. Galanter & Frozena, supra note 5, at 1, 6-7.
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in the past.4 6 Two important factors have contributed to this paradigm
shift. The first was the 1938 promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which introduced the concept of broad discovery and
allowed litigants to learn crucial facts and assess the prospects of a
case before trial.47 The second occurred in the mid-1980s when the
Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases that invigorated the
summary judgment motion. 48 Thus, over the past twenty-five years,
defendants have effectively used information gathered during
discovery to move for summary judgment and dispose of cases before
trial.49
More recently, the Supreme Court has revamped the law on
pleading, making it much more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.50 This heightened
pleading standard provides defendants with another tool to avoid the
risks of trial.5 1 Even better for defendants, a successful motion to
dismiss saves the costs of protracted and expensive discovery.52 It is no

46. Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very PersonalPerspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465,
469 (2012) (discussing the "procedural changes effected by the Supreme Court that have resulted
in the earlier and earlier disposition of litigation and impaired a citizen's opportunity for a
meaningful adjudication of his or her grievances"); Yeazell, supra note 42, at 632-33 ("Civil
process based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has largely replaced trial with motions.").
47. See Langbein, supra note 22, at 522 (noting the shifts in pretrial procedure caused by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Yeazell, supra note 42, at 632-39 (discussing the role of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the decline of trials).
48. Miller, supra note 46, at 470; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)
(holding that summary judgment is warranted if the moving party can show that the opposing
party lacks sufficient evidence to establish an essential element of its case); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986) (articulating a "reasonable jury" standard for granting
summary judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88
(1986) (holding that a party whose claim is rendered implausible by factual circumstances must
make a greater evidentiary showing to survive summary judgment).
49. See Miller, supra note 46, at 469-70 (noting the "earlier disposition of litigation"
resulting from procedural shifts brought about by Supreme Court decisions). Although summary
judgment is theoretically party neutral, in practice, defendants are the real beneficiaries of
summary judgment. Bronsteen, supra note 36, at 523 n.10; see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 616 (2004) (finding that in each fiscal year from
2000 to 2003, a majority of the motions for summary judgment granted by judges in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania favored defendants).
50. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (affirming the Twombly standard for
satisfying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face" to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)).
51. See Miller, supra note 46, at 472-73 (discussing the impact of the heightened pleading
standard formulated in Twombly and Iqbal).
52. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 871, 917 (2011) (discussing the cost savings produced by the Twombly standard).
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wonder that motions to dismiss are being filed and granted at a higher
rate than before. 53
Yet the primary cause of the "vanishing trial" is settlement. It
is an axiom of civil litigation that most cases settle. 54 While this has
always been true, the trend toward settlement has gathered
significant momentum in the past quarter century, thanks in large
part to support from legal academics in two distinct fields: ADR and
law and economics. 55 ADR advocates argue that settlements achieve
higher-quality solutions than adjudication because they "can be
tailored to the parties' polycentric needs" and leave parties more
satisfied than the "binary, win/lose results" of trial.5 6 Law and
economics scholars, by contrast, favor settlement as a cost-effective
alternative to adjudication.57 In addition to saving the parties' time
and money, settlement benefits courts by easing crowded dockets and
preserving limited judicial resources.5 8
Not everyone extols the virtues of settlement, however. This
settlement phenomenon has spawned a vast critical literature, with
many commentators, including a few jurists, wading into the debate.59
While scholars like Owen Fiss oppose settlement altogether, most
have taken a more moderate stance by focusing their criticism on
certain aspects of the trend away from adjudication.
B. Criticism of the Settlement Phenomenon
Civil disputes have always been settled out of court. What has
changed in the past half century, though, is the number of settlements

53. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing DiscriminationLitigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 241 (2011); Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 582, 615 (2010).
54. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1339; see also J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of
Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718-25 (2012) (discussing various factors that have
contributed to the decline of civil trials).
55. Bronsteen, supra note 36, at 522-23.
56. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985); see also Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985) ("Settlement
is a process of reconciliation in which the anger of broken relationships is to be confronted rather
than avoided, and in which healing demands not a truce but confrontation.").
57. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (describing the economic determinants of settlement).
58. See infra Part V (demonstrating that courts consistently encourage settlement of patent
disputes).
59. See infra Section II.B (summarizing scholarly criticism of the settlement phenomenon).
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on both a relative and absolute scale. 60 With the growth and
increasing prominence of settlement has come greater scrutiny.
Owen Fiss provided one of the earliest and most influential
critiques of the ADR movement in his famous essay Against
Settlement. At bottom, Fiss opposes settlement because it achieves
peace rather than justice. 61 In his view, the primary purpose of civil
litigation is not to resolve discrete private disputes but to serve the
public good by explicating common values and norms. 62 When cases
settle, "[t]his duty is not discharged." 63 By way of example, Fiss posits
that, if Brown v. Board of Education had settled, there would be peace
between the parties; yet a settlement would not have achieved justice,
meaning racial equality. 64
Fiss also condemns settlement because the distribution of
power and resources between the parties often is unequal.65 Poorer
parties may not have access to the information they need to accurately
predict the outcome of litigation, so they will be at a disadvantage in
the bargaining process. 66 In these circumstances, civil litigants are
coerced to settle much like indigent criminal defendants are forced to
plea bargain.67 And when settlement is coerced, justice is not served.68
While Fiss has been the boldest critic of settlement, he
certainly is not alone. Settlement draws fierce criticism for removing
litigation from the public realm and depriving society of much-needed

60. See Galanter & Frozena, supra note 5, at 1 (noting the decline over the past fifty years
in the percentage of civil cases ending in trial); Galanter, supra note 6, at 459 (noting the decline
in both the percentage and absolute number of cases ending in trial).
61. Fiss, supra note 24, at 1085-86.
62. Id. at 1085; see also Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273,
1277 (2009) ("Justice is a public good, objectively conceived, and is not reducible to the
maximization of the satisfaction of the preferences of the contestants, which, in any event, are a
function of the deplorable character of the options available to them."); David Luban, Settlements
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2639 (1995) ("To the extent that out-ofcourt settlements are based on bargaining power and negotiation skills, facts lose their
importance to the outcome, and the outcome will resemble legal justice only coincidentally."); Rex
R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2004) ("The view
of 'law' as little more than a process for resolving disputes removes its normative content and
force, and diminishes law's significance in ordering society.").
63. Fiss, supranote 24, at 1085.
64. See id. ('The settlement of a school suit might secure the peace, but not racial
equality.").
65. Id. at 1076 ("[Slettlement is ... a function of the resources available to each party to
finance the litigation, and those resources are frequently distributed unequally.").
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1075.
68. Id.
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decisional law.69 Decisional law is vital because it guides courts on
similar issues, influences future conduct, and contributes to social
debate. 70 Without judicial precedent, laws and policies remain in flux,
behavioral outcomes cannot be predicted, and the potential for
repetitive litigation increases.71 So ironically, "adjudication may often
prove superior to settlement for securing peace because the former,
unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents."72
Another reason scholars have denounced settlement is because
it is shrouded in secrecy.73 Unlike adjudication, the outcome of which
is available to the general public, settlements are usually confidential,
so that only the parties know the terms of the agreement. 74
Defendants often demand secrecy and are willing to pay a high price
for it in order to avoid negative publicity and future lawsuits. 75
Plaintiffs too may rely on confidentiality provisions to prevent the
disclosure of sensitive information or to keep the amount of the
settlement private.76 Though secrecy may serve the litigants well, the
public pays the price. A secret settlement in a products liability case,
for instance, could conceal crucial health and safety information from
the public.77 Moreover, by keeping settlements confidential, parties
69. Luban, supra note 62, at 2622-23; Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in
Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 114-19 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The
Propriety of EradicatingPriorDecisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 589, 589 (1991); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 62, at 21.
70. Luban, supra note 62, at 2622; Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and
Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 804 (2008); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators
Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1123 (2012).
71. Luban, supra note 62, at 2622-23; Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 62, at 19.
72. Luban, supra note 62, at 2623.
73. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) [hereinafter Dore, Secrecy
by Consent] (noting that settlements are often conditioned upon confidentiality agreements that
prohibit disclosure of the terms and amount of the settlement); Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping
Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 946 (2010) ("The vast majority of cases that settle
require as a condition of settlement that the litigating parties keep some aspect of the settlement
a secret."); Luban, supra note 62, at 2648-49 (arguing that "the widespread practice of secret
settlements carves out an unacceptable area of exceptions to democratic publicity"); see also
Laurie Kratky Dore, Public Courts Versus Private Justice:It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 463 (2006) ("Since the early to mid1990s, the issue of secrecy in litigation has attracted nationwide attention and has generated a
literal mountain of commentary.").
74. The obvious exception to this is class action settlements, which must be approved by the
court and made available to the public. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
75. Knutsen, supra note 73, at 951.
76. Id. at 952-53.
77. See Bill Lockyer, Sunshine in the Courts: The Need to Limit Secrecy Agreements that
Hide Information on Hazards, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, pt. II, at 40, 43 (Nov.
27, 1993) (discussing secret settlements involving breast implants, heart valves, and asbestos).
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are able to pass losses onto the consuming public or take other actions
that shift the burden to innocent third parties.78
Critics also contend that settlement should be curbed because
it can leave parties dissatisfied with the outcome of their lawsuit. A
commonly heard clich6 is that successful settlements make everyone
unhappy.79 Yet in many cases, party dissatisfaction is not a sign of a
fair, mutually derived compromise but instead reflects "the parties'
relative stamina and vulnerability to the pressures of a prolonged
dispute."80 In other words, despite serious reservations about a
settlement's terms, parties will nevertheless agree because they feel
extreme logistical pressure to end the case. 8 '
C. Judicial Encouragement of Settlement
In addition to settlement critics, there is a group of scholars
who accept that settlement will play some role in our civil justice
system 82 but question the participation of federal judges in that
process. Traditionally, civil litigation was "party-initiated" and "partycontrolled,"83 and judges were expected to remain passive and
disengaged in order to ensure fairness and impartiality. 84 That began
to change as federal dockets exploded and judges took on new case
management responsibilities. 85
Unlike their predecessors, "managerial judges" are not simply
neutral adjudicators. They participate in every phase of the litigation,
acting as schedulers, planners, mediators, and negotiators.86 The
managerial judge's main objective is to control the calendar and

78.

Luban, supra note 62, at 2626.

79.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet

the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1211 n.221 (1995); Dev. K. Sethi, Mediation & Settlement

Conferences: A Practical View from the Plaintiffs Perspective, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Oct. 2007, at 36, 39
("You know it's a good settlement when everyone walks away unhappy.").

80. Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation& Flexibility in Informal Process: Cautions
from the Divorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 585, 592 (1987).
81. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1353 ("[W]e have heard a litany of complaints from
insurers and corporate and governmental defendants, telling us how they were forced into
nuisance settlements or very large settlements that were not deserved.").
82. Dore, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 73, at 294 ("Even the staunchest defenders of
adjudication .. . grudgingly acknowledge that settlement will remain a permanent fixture of the
litigation landscape."); Glover, supranote 54, at 1725 ("Settlement is here to stay.").

83. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1283 (1976).
84. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982).

85. Id. at 378; Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69
JUDICATURE 257, 257 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, supranote 56, at 490.
86. Resnik, supranote 84, at 379.
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docket,87 and the surest way to accomplish that is by persuading
litigants to settle.88
To this end, federal judges take myriad approaches to
settlement. 89 At one end of the spectrum are judges who become
intimately involved in settling the cases assigned to them for trial.90
These judges intervene to facilitate settlement, either subtly "through
the use of cues/suggestions," or aggressively "through the use of direct
pressure."9 ' For example, one federal judge admits to taking the
following tack at the pretrial conference in personal injury cases: "I
look at the doctors' reports-just the last paragraph, where they show
the extent of injury . . . I tell [the lawyers], 'this case is worth $20,000

for the settlement,' and I tell them why; and I tell them further to go
tell their clients that I said so."92 Interventionist judges might also
conduct settlement conferences, broker deals, or even have the final
say on whether the settlement is acceptable. 93
Other federal judges take a more hands-off approach to
settlement. This type of jurist discusses settlement with the parties at
certain pretrial conferences as required by the Federal Rules.94 She
may also ask the parties to keep her apprised of developments
regarding settlement, gently prod the parties to continue settlement
discussions if they reach an impasse, or set a firm trial date.95 But
that's probably it. That said, the usual reason these judges remain

87. Kimba Wood & Charles Brieant, On Judging Today in District Courts, FED. LAW., May
2007, at 20, 22 ("The modern judge is quickly becoming a slave to statistics.").
88. Id.; Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2009) ("The most conspicuous of settlement's contributions to
modern litigation is its capacity to reduce the number of cases demanding judicial resources and
attention.").
89. Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement Conference Nuts and Bolts:
Settlement Judges FacilitatingCommunication, Compromise and Fear, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
97, 98 (2012).
90. Galanter, supranote 6, at 462.
91. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1342; Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 62, at 25
("Judges may use heavy-handed pressure to urge parties to settle.").
92. J. Skelly Wright, The PretrialConference, 28 F.R.D. 37, 145 (1962).
93. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 337 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2009) (arguing that settlement in
the Agent Orange case was essential).
94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (stating that one purpose of the pretrial conference is to
facilitate settlement).
95. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1340-41 (arguing that judges promote
settlement at pretrial conferences).
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hands-off is not because they are per se opposed to settlement; rather,
they view ADR as outside the scope of judicial expertise.96
Whatever their level of involvement, virtually all federal judges
agree that settlement is a good thing to be encouraged and
facilitated.97 Yet allowing judges to promote settlement raises a
number of concerns.98 For one, it provides greater opportunities for
federal district judges-who are already quite powerful-to abuse
their positions of authority. 99 Not only do these judges dictate the
pretrial schedule and control all phases of the litigation, but they can
exert extreme pressure on parties to settle. 00 As a supposedly neutral
authority figure, parties tend to afford undue weight to a judge's
assessment of the strengths or weaknesses of a claim. 01 In this way,
judges are able to coerce settlements. What is more, these settlement

96. Id. at 1344 (explaining that judges stay out of settlement based on perception of their
own negotiating skills); Brian J. Shoot & Christopher T. McGrath, "Don't Come Back Without a

Reasonable Offer"-Surprisingly Little Direct Authority Guides How Judges Can Move Parties,
N.Y. ST. B.A. J., May 2004, at 28, 33:
[M]ost of the judges who adopt a 'hands-off posture to settlements do so not as a
result of legal or ethical misgivings, but instead for the simpler reason that they do
not like to do so and do not see 'brokering' or mediating as part of the job description
of a New York Supreme Court justice.
97. Robinson, supra note 89, at 98; Galanter, supra note 85, at 261; Galanter & Cahill,
supra note 3, at 1346. A few federal judges have gone on the record questioning the conclusion
that settlement is always the best result. See, e.g., James E. Gritzner, In Defense of the Jury

Trial: ADR Has Its Place, But It Is Not the Only Place, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 349, 349-54 (2012)
(arguing that we should curb the increasing trend towards ADR); Robert F. Peckham, The
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guidinga Case from Filingto Disposition,69
CALIF. L. REV. 770, 773 (1981) ("While few judges wish to force unwilling parties to settle, many
judges believe that the promotion of informed and fair settlements is one of the most important
aims of pretrial management."); Wood & Brieant, supra note 87, at 22 ("I submit to you that we
have lost something when we have become too preoccupied with case management, caseload
numbers, and institutional pressures to settle cases, which may be counterproductive with
respect to the administration of justice.").
98. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 84, at 424-31 (arguing that "the growth of federal judges'
interest in [judicial] management has coincided with their articulation of due process values,
their emphasis on the relationship between procedure and just decisionmaking").

99. Id. at 425-26; David Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (1989) ("Judges are human and humans tend to
abuse power when they have it; Rule 16 is surely no exception."); Yeazell, supra note 42, at 647
("[Clontrol of litigation has moved further down the legal food chain-from appellate to trial
courts. . . .").

100. See Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: TwoHeaded Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 16 (stating that judicial
pressure to settle can be "intense"); Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence of Trials as a

Dispute Resolution Device: Implications for the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 1127
(2012) (noting that some courts sanction parties who fail to accept a settlement or reach a
settlement by a court-imposed deadline); Schuck, supra note 93, at 359-61 (suggesting that
judges may coerce parties into settlement through overreaching).
101. Perschbacher & Bassett, supranote 62, at 25.
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discussions usually take place off the record, so judicial acts taken in
furtherance of settlement are sheltered from public scrutiny and
beyond the reach of appellate review. 102
An equally weighty concern that the judiciary's involvement in
settlement creates is the threat it poses to impartiality.103 The
Supreme Court has consistently held that a judge must be impartial,
meaning he has no prior involvement or interest in the dispute.104 In
the pursuit of settlement, however, judges become "involved" in cases:
they gather information about the claims and defenses while
interacting with the litigants on a regular basis.105 Consequently,
judges may develop intense feelings of admiration or antipathy for the
parties and their lawyers, and they may form false impressions about
the merits of the case. 06 This can become a real problem if the parties
fail to settle; by the time the case reaches trial, the judge may favor
one side and therefore no longer be an impartial decisionmaker.
Academic criticisms aside, settlement remains the norm in
federal civil litigation today. Lawsuits are filed in order to facilitate
settlement, and cases that go to trial are aberrations. Patent
litigation, which has been on the rise in recent years, is no exception
to the general trend.
III. THE SETTLEMENT PHENOMENON

IN PATENT LITIGATION

The purpose of our patent system, as set forth in the
Constitution, is to benefit the public by "promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." 0 7 Patents promote innovation by rewarding
inventors of new and useful technologies with limited periods of
exclusivity to practice (or license) their inventions. 08 In the event this
right of exclusivity is violated, a patent owner may enforce his rights
in federal court by suing for infringement. 09

102. Id.; Resnik, supra note 84, at 425-26.
103. Resnik, supra note 84, at 426-31.

104. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59 (1972) (holding that a city
mayor cannot serve as an impartial judge because of the possible conflict with his executive
interests); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (holding that an impartial decisionmaker
is "essential").
105. See Resnik, supra note 84, at 427; Shapiro, supra note 99, at 1995-96.
106. Resnik, supra note 84, at 425 (explaining that some of the impressions the judge forms
could be based on a lawyer's inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading statements during settlement
talks).
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (outlining a patent term of twenty years).
109. Id. § 271. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. Id. § 1338.
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Unlike other areas of complex civil litigation, patent suits
involve a fairly uniform set of claims. In virtually all patent cases, the
patent owner alleges patent infringement, and the alleged infringer
denies that charge and also claims the patent is invalid, meaning the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") erred in deciding that the
invention was patentable.110 While there can be some variation in the
posture of the suit-for example, it is sometimes the alleged infringer
who initiates the litigation as a declaratory judgment action rather
than the patent owner as an infringement action-the same issues are
at stake in most patent cases."'
Typically in patent litigation, both parties have something to
lose. If the alleged infringer is held liable, the potential remedies
include an injunction, treble damages, and even attorneys' fees in
some cases. 112 On the flip side, the patent owner faces the possibility
that the court will render its patent(s) invalid. 13 With so much at
stake, patent litigation (much like other types of civil litigation)
usually resolves through settlement.114 In the past, when patent
litigation affected limited industries, the dangers that patent
settlements posed were minimal. But there has been an explosion of
patent litigation and, consequently, patent settlements in recent
years.115
A. The Rise of Patent Litigation
There was a time when patents and the litigation surrounding
patents were considered somewhat obscure, affecting only narrow
sectors of the economy. But that has changed. Today, patents matter
110. See Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standardfor Evaluating Patent
Litigants'Access to the DeclaratoryJudgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 410 (2007) ("[M]ost
commonly, infringement defendants request judgment on the ground that the patent at issue is
invalid, unenforceable, andlor not infringed."). Issued patents are presumed valid, but their
validity can be challenged in federal court. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
111. See, e.g., Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of DeclaratoryJudgment
to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2012) (noting that
alleged infringers often file declaratory judgment actions to forum shop).
112. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
119 (discussing the need to calculate risk of damages and injunctions in deciding whether to
litigate).
113. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding
that, once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent owner from
ever asserting it again).
114. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 272 ("[Tihe vast majority of cases settle."); Marketa
Trimble, When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look at the Involvement of Foreign
Defendants in Patent Litigation in the U.S., 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499,

519 (2011) ("[M]ost patent cases end in settlement. . . .").
115. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 127 (2008).
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to companies across the globe in a cross section of industries. The
number of patents issued by the PTO increased fivefold between 1963
and 2011.116 Even more dramatic is the rise in patent litigation, with
ten times more patent suits filed in U.S. federal courts in 2006 than in
1990.117 Indeed, the rate of patent lawsuits is rising faster than any
other type of civil litigation. 118
There are various explanations for this rise. One is that the
more patents the PTO issues, the more lawsuits that will be filed. 119
Yet other less apparent factors have contributed to the increase of
patent litigation as well. Some point the finger at patent-assertion
entities, whose business model is based exclusively on procuring and
enforcing patents. 120 Others blame plaintiffs' lawyers who turned to
patent litigation in the face of a successful tort reform movement.121
Whatever the cause, the end result is that there are thousands of
patent cases filed in federal court every year. The next Section
discusses how those cases are usually resolved.
B. How Patent Cases Are Resolved
The empirical evidence indicates that very few civil cases filed
in federal court these days end in trial. In 2011, for example, just over
1%of federal civil actions were tried before a judge or a jury.122 That
does not mean the rest of the cases settled, however. Rather, a
significant portion of cases are disposed of through pretrial motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment.123 Still, at the end of the day, it
remains true that most civil cases are settled. 124
116. ELEC. INFO. PRODS. DIV. & PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS [hereinafter U.S. PATENT STATISTICS], available at
http://perma.cc/5WQL-RXSP; see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency

Funding Affect Decisionmaking?:An Empirical Assessment of the PTO's GrantingPatterns, 66
VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (2013) (arguing that the PTO's fee structure biases the agency toward
granting patents).
117. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 115, at 127-28.

118. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau et al., The New Private Ordering of Intellectual Property:
The Emergence of Contractsas the Drivers of Intellectual PropertyRights, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 5,
31 n.69 (2009).
119. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 115, at 127-28 (discussing the steady increase in
patent litigation); U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, supra note 115 (illustrating the dramatic increase in
the number of patents issued by the PTO).
120. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012).

121. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China's
Intellectual PropertyRegime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 776 n.20 (2011).

122. Galanter & Frozena, supra note 5, at 3.
123. See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 36, at 522 (characterizing summary judgment as an
increasingly popular form of dispute resolution); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the

Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005)
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Based on this general data about federal civil litigation, one
could extrapolate that the majority of patent cases likewise are
settled. Fortunately, though, the explosion of patent litigation has
given birth to an important body of empirical literature, so it is not
necessary to rely on extrapolation. For example, scholars have
gathered and analyzed data concerning various substantive patent
law issues, 12 5 the types of patents that tend to be enforced, 126 and the
length and cost of patent litigation. 127 Of course, the studies most
relevant to this Article investigate the resolution of patent cases and
the settlement of patent suits in particular.
The most comprehensive study to date on how litigants resolve
patent disputes was conducted by Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball. 128
Focusing on the dockets of federal district courts in three separate
years-1995, 1997, and 2000-Kesan and Ball culled data from
approximately 6,300 patent cases nationwide. 129 They then examined
the case histories in great detail in order to determine how each case
ultimately was resolved.
Having recorded and studied the data, Kesan and Ball then
drew several conclusions. They first found that 18-20% of cases were
(explaining that changes in summary judgment law and vigorous enforcement will result in
fewer trials taking place).
124. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1339.
125. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208-10 (1998) (explaining that the nonobviousness
requirement is responsible for invalidating more patents than any other patent rule); Glynn S.

Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (finding that, since the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent
owners are more likely to lose on infringement than validity grounds); David L. Schwartz,

Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 223 (2008) (examining whether U.S. district court judges improve
their skills at patent claim construction with experience, such as having their cases reviewed on
appeal).
126. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004)
[hereinafter Allison et al., Valuable Patents] (describing the characteristics of litigated patents);

John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristicsof the Most-Litigated
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) ("[T]he most-litigated patents are far more likely to be
software and telecommunications patents, not mechanical or other types of patents."); Colleen V.
Chien, PredictingPatent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2011) (examining both intrinsic
and acquired characteristics of patents).
127. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3, 8, 11), available at http://perma.cc/S557SQTE (asserting that an "explosion" in patent litigation initiated by "Non-Practicing Entities
(NPEs)" imposes substantial direct costs on inventors); James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer,
The Private Costs of Patent Litigation 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
07-08, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/JC5M-NPDE (finding the expected joint loss to the
litigating parties is large, despite the fact that most patent lawsuits settle short of trial).
128. Kesan & Ball, supranote 3.
129. Id. at 259-61.
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resolved through nonmerit dispositions, including dismissals for lack
of jurisdiction and default judgments.130 On the other hand, 11-16% of
the cases ended in a decision on the merits. 13 1 Most of the rulings on
the merits resulted from summary judgment motions (7-8%),
however, not trials; only between 1-5% percent of patent cases end in
trial. 132 While those numbers are low, patent cases are still more likely
to reach trial than other types of civil suits, perhaps because of the
high stakes involved.133
So what happens to the rest of the patent disputes? Not
surprisingly, Kesan and Ball found that the vast majority of patent
cases settled. 134 Over the three-year period studied, between 65-68%
of patent cases were resolved at the district court level through
36
settlement. 13 5 And though not central to this particular study,1
additional settlements occur as well during the appellate phase of
patent litigation. 137 Based on these results, Kesan and Ball concluded
that "patent litigation is largely a settlement mechanism." 138 They
therefore urged entities seeking determinative rulings on patent
validity and infringement to look beyond the federal courts, perhaps to
the PTO or some other ADR mechanism. 139
Other recent empirical work sheds important light on
additional aspects of the settlement phenomenon in patent cases. For
instance, Mark Lemley, John Allison, and Joshua Walker published a
study in 2011 concerning settlement among repeat patent litigants
("the Lemley study"). 140 The Lemley study focuses on the most
litigated patents, meaning those patents that have been the subject of
eight or more lawsuits between 2000 and 2009.141 Lemley et al.
identified 106 patents that satisfied that criteria and determined that

130. Id. at 273-74 tbls.4, 5 & 6.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Compare id. at 274 tbl.6 (finding that 3% of patent cases ended in trial in 2000), with
Galanter & Frozena, supra note 5, at 3 fig. 1 (finding that 2% of federal civil suits involved a trial
in 2000).
134. Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 272.
135. Id. at 273-74 tbls.4, 6.
136. Id. at 266 n.192.
137. See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE
STATISTICS, available at http://perma.cc/H5B6-CHAB (indicating that forty-four patent appeals
were settled through the Federal Circuit's mediation program in 2011).
138. Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 312.
139. Id.
140. Allison et al., supra note 14, at 677.
141. There were 106 such patents that had been litigated in 478 different patent suits
against multiple defendants. Id. at 682.
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those patents had been litigated in 478 separate suits.142 They
recorded the outcomes of those cases and then compared and
contrasted them to cases involving patents litigated only once. Some of
the results of the Lemley study are surprising, and frankly
disheartening, for those who believe that patents are indicative of
innovative output.
At the outset, Lemley et al. found that suits involving the most
litigated patents are more likely to settle than one-off patent suitS. 14 3
Since all available economic measures suggest that the most litigated
patents are also the most valuable patents, this result might seem
counterintuitive.144 In point of fact, though, it is easily explained.
Precisely because these patents are so valuable, their owners proceed
with caution. Often, the holders of these patents have widely licensed
them to other parties or have asserted them against different
defendants in other lawsuits.' 45 Under these circumstances, the
patentee has a lot to lose if the patent is invalidated at trial.146 So it
makes sense that these cases are more likely to be resolved through
settlement.
What is surprising, though, is what happens when cases
involving the most litigated patents are adjudicated rather than
settled. Because these are the most valuable patents,147 one would
expect them to withstand validity challenges and fare well at trial.148
Yet the data tell a different story. The most litigated patent plaintiffs
won only 10.7% of their cases, whereas one-time patent plaintiffs
prevailed 35.6% of the time.149 Lemley et al. tested the data in a
number of different ways, and each time the results were the same:
the most litigious patentees were significantly more likely to lose on

142. Id. at 682 & n.23. Because many of the 478 suits involved more than one of the 106
most litigated patents, the total number of "patent-suit pairs" identified by Lemley et al. is 2,987.
Id. at 682 n.23.
143. Id. at 689 (indicating that 90.5% of the most litigated patent suits settled while only
84% of the one-time patent suits ended in settlement).
144. Id. at 686; Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 126, at 437; see also Matthew C.
Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based Theory of
Litigation at the World Trade Organization, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 385, 398 (2011) (stating
that parties who believe they will prevail at trial are less likely to settle).
145. Allison et al., supra note 14, at 686.
146. Id.
147. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 126, at 437.
148. Allison et al., supra note 14, at 686 (explaining that one purpose of their study is to test
the hypothesis that "where the most-litigated patents do get litigated to judgment, the patentee
is more likely to prevail than other litigants").
149. Id. at 687 & n.35. If default judgments are included, the win rate for one-time patent
plaintiffs increases to 47.3%. Id. at 688 tbl.4.

AGAINST SOME PATENT SETTLEMENTS

2014]

397

the merits. 50 Although the authors attempt to explain these
unpredicted findings, they admit in the end that their proffered
explanations are not entirely satisfactory.15 1 Instead, the results of the
study remain "a bit of a puzzle."152
The bottom line is that most patent cases are settled. While
this fact may be unremarkable, few scholars have explored the
normative implications of this phenomenon. The remainder of this
Article sets out to prove that settlement of some patent cases is
contrary to the public good and to offer suggestions for righting this
wrong.
IV. PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

As the Constitution itself contemplates, the public is the
intended primary beneficiary of our patent system.153 Though
inventors reap the rewards of patents, that is simply a means to an
end.154 The objective of granting patents is to encourage useful,
socially valuable innovation that inures to the public good.155 Keeping
that objective in mind, this Part considers the impact of patent
settlements on the public by contextualizing the arguments of Fiss
and others within the patent litigation framework.
A. Patent Settlements Achieve Peace, Not Justice
Fiss opposes settlement because it achieves peace instead of
justice.156 Perhaps this criticism is easy to understand when reflecting
on a case like Brown v. Board of Education, where the plaintiffs were

150. Id. at 687-88.
151. Id. at 700-11.
152. Id. at 681.
153. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See also Robert P. Merges et al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 29 (6th ed. 2012) ('The public benefits directly through the
spur to innovation and disclosure of new technology."); Megan M. La Belle, PatentLaw as Public
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 50 (2012) (demonstrating that the purpose of the patent system
is to benefit the public).
154. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) ("[The promotion of the
progress of science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward of inventors is secondary and
merely a means to that end.")
155. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J., concurring) ('The patent law is directed to the public purposes of fostering
technological progress, investment in research and development, capital formation,
entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength, and international competitiveness."), rev'd, 520

U.S. 17 (1997).
156. Fiss, supra note 24, at 1085-86.
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fighting for racial equality. 15 7 But what about patent suits? Do patent
settlements further peace at the expense of justice? I maintain that
some do. And while the injustice effected by patent settlements may
not be as blatant and perverse as racial inequality, it is nonetheless
real.
The principal way patent settlements skirt justice is by
allowing potentially invalid patents to remain in force. 158 The problem
with invalid patents is that they may thwart competition and increase
prices yet fail to foster innovation when the technology disclosed was
already part of the public domain. 15 9 Thus, when a patent suit is
adjudicated and the patent is invalidated, a public good is created.160
The previously protected intellectual property is returned to the public
domain, where anyone is free to use it, not just the party who
successfully challenged the patent. 161 This can be devastating to
patent owners, as licensees no longer have to pay royalties, and the
floodgates of competition open wide. 162
By settling, on the other hand, the patent owner can protect its
patent from invalidation. 163 As a condition to settlement, patent
owners typically demand that alleged infringers abandon the validity

157. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
158. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 121 (1854) (holding a patent invalid and
therefore "unjust to the public"). For purposes of this Article, I am equating "justice" with law.
See McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 56, at 1664 ("Fiss comes close to equating justice with law").
In other words, a just patent is one that accords with our current legal standards. Yet I leave for
future work the perhaps more interesting question of how justice in the patent context should be
defined.
159. Carrier, supra note 20, at 105.
160. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(holding that, once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent
owner from ever asserting it again); La Belle, supra note 153, at 65 (discussing the "public good
problem," which "dissuades parties from contesting patents because they bear all the costs and
risks of litigation, but reap only part of the benefit"); Joseph S. Miller, Building a Better Bounty:
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 704-05 (2004)
(explaining that litigation-stage bounties adequately reward the defeat of commercially
significant patents).
161. La Belle, supra note 153, at 65. I say may be free to use it because, even when one
patent has been invalidated, the ability to exploit a technology is potentially limited by the
existence of blocking patents held by the patent owner or a third party. See, e.g., Miller, supra
note 160, at 693-95.
162. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969).
163. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) ("It
would be odd to handicap the ability of [the defendant] to settle after it had displayed sufficient
confidence in its patent to risk a finding of invalidity by taking the case to trial."), abrogated by
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013); Holman, supra note 15, at 507-09 (explaining

that reverse payment settlements insulate pharmaceutical patentees from competition without
the risk of invalidation).
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claim and agree not to challenge the patent again in the future. 164 The
result is that potentially invalid patents-patents that the PTO never
should have issued in the first place-remain in force. 165 One court has
acknowledged this "troubling dynamic":
The less sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, and therefore the less
justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, the more a rule permitting
settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent. But
the law allows the settlement even of suits involving weak patents with the
presumption that the patent is valid and that settlement is merely an extension of the
valid patent monopoly. So long as the law encourages settlement, weak patent cases will
likely be settled even though such settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies
166
that are, perhaps, undeserved.

What makes this dynamic especially troubling is that it is not
only patent owners who wish to avoid invalidation of these patents but
alleged infringers as well.167 At first blush, the notion that alleged
infringers would want contested patents to remain in force seems
counterintuitive. On closer reflection, however, it becomes clear that
alleged infringers are motivated to settle patent suits by what scholars
call the "free rider problem." 16 8 When a patent is adjudged invalid, it
creates a public good because the technological "know how" is returned
to the public domain.169 While this public good enhances the social
welfare (by lowering consumer prices), it concomitantly benefits the
alleged infringer's competitors, who bore none of the costs or risks of
litigation but "enjoy the outcome for free."170 To avoid this free rider
164. See, e.g., Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1367-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that a settlement agreement with an express provision precluding future validity challenges did
not violate Lear); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that it
was permissible for the provision in the consent decree to preclude further validity challenges);
see also infra Part V.C (discussing the Federal Circuit's prosettlement jurisprudence).
165. See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (explaining that settlements involving weak
patents may protect monopolies that are unjustified).
166. Id. While the Tamoxifen court's statement was made in the context of reverse payment
settlements and thus may no longer hold water after FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230
(2013), it is certainly still true with respect to standard patent settlements, which the Supreme
Court did not address in Actavis.
167. See La Belle, supra note 153, at 65-66 (discussing the "public good problem"); see also
infra Part V (arguing that courts also want patent cases to settle).
168. See Carrier, supra note 20, at 111, 118 (discussing the "public good problem" and the
"free-rider problem"); Joseph Farell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952, 958 (2004) (same); Miller, supra note 160,
at 687 (same). This is also sometimes referred to as the "public good problem." Farell & Merges,
supra,at 952.
169. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343, 346-50 (1971) .
170. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, DethroningLear? Incentives to Innovate After
MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 1001 n.121 (2009); see also Michael Risch, Patent
Challenges and Royalty Inflation, 85 IND. L.J. 1003, 1022 (2010) (explaining the imbalance when
"the challenger faces all of the cost and risk but only reaps some of the benefits"); John R.
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problem, therefore, alleged infringers settle out of court and stipulate
to the validity of the patent.
So at the end of the day, patent cases settle in order to achieve
peace between the patent owner and the alleged infringer.171 In the
world of patent litigation-which has been referred to alternatively as
warfare,172 the "sport of kings,"173 and "the business of sharks,"174peace is not something to be taken lightly. But it would be
disingenuous to pretend that peace between the parties is all that
matters to our patent system, or even that it's what matters most. To
the contrary, the purpose of our patent system is to serve the public
interest.175 As the Supreme Court has explained,
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.. . . [1It is an exception to
the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.
The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public
a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free
from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
17 6
legitimate scope.

Yet the settlement of patent cases leaves this paramount public
interest wholly unprotected.177 There is no neutral party representing
the public in patent litigation like there is in patent proceedings
before the International Trade Commission.178 Nor do federal judges
intervene on the public's behalf when parties decide to settle a patent
case. Rather, as this Article discusses later, federal courts regularly
allow (and sometimes strongly encourage) patent settlements, even
when that means a weak patent will remain intact and leave the
Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HoUS. L. REV. 569, 618 n.361 & 619 (2002)
(discussing the "free-rider" problem).
171. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Quanta and the Future of Supreme Court Patent Jurisprudence,
9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC. 73, 74 (2008) ("[In] settlement negotiations around
ongoing or potential patent litigation, or mediation of a patent dispute, . . . what the potential
infringer often wants is mere peace from future litigation risk. . . ."); Miller, supra note 160, at
672-73 (stating that settlement gives the parties peace and leaves the patent intact).
172. Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1891, 1892 (2012); see also FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS 29 (1994).
173. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 2.
174. Chien, supranote 2, at 1573.
175. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) ("[A
patent] is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the 'Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' ").

176. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (quoting
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816).
177. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2005)
(suggesting that rules allowing settlements at or above expected market value for the infringer
will allow weak patents to persist).
178. Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233, 250-51
(2014).
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public to suffer the consequences. 179 In this way, the settlement of
patent cases comes at the expense of justice.
B. Patent Settlements Are Often Coerced
Fiss's claim that settlements are coerced is also borne out in
the context of patent litigation. In recent years, there has been
widespread discontent over coerced or "forced" settlements of patent
cases, primarily due to the emergence of patent-assertion entities
("PAEs").1s0 PAEs, or "trolls" as they are pejoratively called, are
entities that acquire and assert patents but do not practice their
patented inventions. 181 PAEs have been accused of asserting
particularly weak patents 182 and using overly aggressive litigation
tactics. 183 For some time, the PAE business model was quite successful
because PAEs used the threat of a permanent injunction (which was
virtually guaranteed under Federal Circuit law) to force accused
infringers to settle patent cases. 184 PAEs, in other words, engaged in
the practice of "patent holdup."185
This holdup problem mobilized a groundswell of support for
patent reform. 186 In 2006, the Supreme Court took up the issue in
179. See infra Part V (discussing the role of courts in patent settlements).
180. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 297 (2010) (coining the term
"patent assertion entity"); see also Robert A. Armitage, The Conundrum Confronting Congress:
The Patent System Must Be Left Untouched While Being Radically Reformed, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 268, 276 (2006) ("Being forced to settle because there is little prospect for a
fair fight against a patent of questionable validity is the antithesis of a fair and balanced patent
system."); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1831 (2007) ("[A] troll only needs a single and cheap
patent to force a large settlement.").
181. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (describing PAEs).
182. Chien, supra note 2, at 1580.
183. Id. at 1579 (stating that PAEs "surpris[e] their targets" and sue multiple defendants).
184. Id.; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[A]n injunction ... can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant
fees."); Garrett Barten, Note, Permanent Injunctions: A Discretionary Remedy for Patent
Infringement in the Aftermath of the eBay Decision, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007) (noting
that the threat of an injunction forced RIM to settle for $612.5 million, nearly eighteen times the
amount the jury awarded in damages).
185. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REV.
1991, 1992-93 (2007); Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909, 931 (2009) (defining patent holdup as "the
opportunistic use of patent rights to extract above-benchmark compensation").
186. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
733, 742 (2012) ("The furor over NPEs and their skewed incentives grew in the years leading up
to the eBay decision.").
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eBay v. MercExchange and overturned the Federal Circuit's
automatic-injunction rule in patent cases.187 The Supreme Court held
that the grant of permanent injunctive relief in patent cases should be
governed by "traditional principles of equity."188 This means that
federal courts must consider the facts of each particular case before
deciding whether the issuance of such a severe remedy is warranted.
It has been several years since eBay, and the data demonstrate
that courts grant fewer injunctions in patent cases than in the past. 189
This is particularly true for cases involving PAEs, with one study
showing that courts denied over 90% of injunctions sought by PAEs
but contested by the alleged infringer.190 Thus, it's probably fair to say
that eBay has ameliorated the holdup problem to some degree. 191 That
said, there remain several factors that pressure patent defendants to
continue to forego adjudication in favor of settlement.
First, even after eBay, permanent injunctions remain the norm
in patent cases when there is a finding of infringement.192 While
courts are significantly less likely to grant this type of relief to PAEs,
other types of patent plaintiffs regularly secure permanent injunctions
post-eBay. 193 Indeed, courts grant permanent injunctive relief in 75%
of cases in which patent owners request it.194 This threat remains
significant enough to force accused infringers to settle rather than risk
an injunction that shuts down operations.195
Second, putting aside injunctive relief for the moment, the
potential for massive damages pressures many patent defendants into
settlement.196 Juries have awarded record damages in several patent
187. 547 U.S. at 393-94.
188. Id. at 394.
189. Chien & Lemley, supra note 181, at 9-10 ("[Clourts have granted about 75% of requests
for injunctions, down from an estimated 95% pre-eBay."); see also Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick M.
Arenz, Non-PracticingEntities and PermanentInjunctions Post-eBay, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 203,
205 (2011) (acknowledging the view that NPEs are not likely to be awarded permanent
injunctions post-eBay).
190. Chien & Lemley, supra note 181, at 10-11.
191. Id. at 8-10.
192. See, e.g., Schutz & Arenz, supra note 189, at 205 ("Four years after eBay, courts still
routinely grant injunctions to victorious patent holders.").
193. Chien & Lemley, supra note 181, at 10-11 (finding that universities and individuals
have been granted injunctions 100% and 90% of the time, respectively, since eBay).
194. Id. at 9-10.
195. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia's "Renegade Jurisdiction": Lessons for Patent Law
Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 118 (2008). Preliminary injunctions, too, can be used to force
defendants to settle patent cases. Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and
Litigation:A First Examination,87 N.C. L. REV. 101, 139-40 (2009).
196. Robert A. Armitage, Now That the Courts Have Beaten Congress to the Punch, Why Is
Congress Still Punching the Patent System?, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 43, 46 (2007)
(explaining that some believe the "threat of runaway damages ... has forced extravagant
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cases in recent years, 197 including the highly publicized $1.05 billion
verdict that Apple won in its suit against Samsung over smartphone
technology.198 Even for large companies, a judgment of this size could
be detrimental. Consequently, accused infringers wishing to avoid this
result repeatedly resort to settlement even when the patent is likely
invalid. 199
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the astronomical cost of
litigation coerces accused patent infringers to settle. While all civil
litigation is expensive, patent suits are in a class of their own. 200 The
median cost of patent litigation in 2013 ranged from $350,000 to
$5.5 million, depending on the amount at risk and the case's
duration. 201 With these daunting statistics, it is no wonder defendants
choose to pay nuisance settlements rather than pursue a validity
challenge in court. 202
The problem of coerced patent settlements has received some
well-deserved attention lately, with close to a dozen bills aimed at
curbing "patent litigation abuse" being introduced in Congress since
last May. 2 03 These bills propose various reforms-including
heightened pleading standards, limitations on discovery, and
expanded fee-shifting authority-all of which are supposed to
ameliorate the "forced" settlement of patent cases. 204 The proposed
settlements of patent lawsuits"); Love, supra note 185, at 928 ("[T]he expected value of courtawarded royalties alone will place pressure on accused infringers to eschew litigation and
negotiate a settlement ex ante.").
TO

197. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: LITIGATION CONTINUES
RISE AMID
GROWING AWARENESS
OF PATENT VALUE 8 (2013), available at

http://perma.cc/Z66N-L9YQ (listing the ten largest initial damages awards in patent cases
between 1995 and 2011).
198. Since the initial jury verdict, the court reduced damages to just under $599 million and
ordered a retrial at which Apple was awarded $290 million, bringing the current damages total
to about $935 million. See Julianne Pepitone, Jury Awards Samsung Another $290 Million,
http://perma.cc/QG76-5RJY (cnn.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
199. Allison et al., supra note 14, at 709 (arguing that the data suggest that many patent
settlements are "nuisance settlement[s] over a likely invalid patent").
200. Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1502 (2001).
201. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC

SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011).
202. See, e.g., Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 824 (2d
Cir. 1946) ("[I]t is well known that the notoriously great cost of [a patent] defense has often
induced infringers to accept licenses on onerous terms rather than to engage in litigation, with
the result that 'spurious' patents, uncontested, substantially reduce competition.").
203. Matt Levy, Patent Progress'sGuide to Patent Reform Legislation, http://perma.cc/P5TGC9R3 (patentprogress.org, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
204. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Transparency and
Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th
Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013).
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legislation enjoys broad support from a cross section of industries, 205
and representatives of several organizations have provided testimony
to Congress in recent months. Many of these witnesses testified that
accused infringers often view settlement as the only viable option:
"The high cost of patent litigation means that settlement is almost
always the least costly option, and the patent trolls know it. In
fact ... approximately 75% of these cases settle, so the trolls know
they have a virtually guaranteed payoff, for virtually no upfront
investment or preparation." 206
Others testified that their companies have chosen to litigate as
a matter of principle but have spent millions of dollars as a result. 207
These supporters believe that the reforms currently under
consideration would help rectify the coerced-settlement problem,
either by facilitating earlier dismissal of patent cases or by reducing
the financial burden on accused infringers, so that they could afford to
adjudicate rather than settle.
Whether these predictions are accurate-and whether
Congress will act on patent reform this session-remains to be seen.
While the House passed one of these bills (Representative Goodlatte's
"Innovation Act") by a vote of 325 to 91 last December, 208 the
legislation is still under consideration in the Senate. 209 The Senate has

205. See, e.g., Letter from 50 Organizations to Congressional Leadership Urging Solutions to
Patent Abuse (July 17, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/VW93-33VJ.
206. Improving the Patent System to Promote American Innovation and Competitiveness:
Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Kevin
T. Kramer, Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel of Intellectual Prop. for Yahoo! Inc.); see also
Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse: Hearing
Before S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Dana Rao, Vice President &
Assoc. Gen. Counsel of Intellectual Prop. & Litig. for Adobe Sys., Inc.) ("Bad actors are taking
advantage of asymmetrical costs of patent litigation to pressure defendants into settlement."); id.
(statement of John Dwyer, President & CEO of New Eng. Fed. Credit Union) ("Although it
violates one's basic sense of right and wrong, paying up makes some economic sense for a credit
union of my size."); id. (statement of Phillip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Prop. Counsel for
Johnson & Johnson) ("[P]atent troll abuse involves the use of court proceedings, or threats of
them, to press specious patent claims or defenses for the purpose of coercing settlements driven
solely by the desire to avoid litigation costs.").
207. See, e.g., Improving the Patent System, supra note 206 (statement of Krish Gupta,
Senior Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel for EMC Corp.).
208. Press Release, House Passes Innovation Act to Make Reforms to Our Patent System,
available at
5, 2013),
House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec.
U.S.
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/12052013.html.
209. The bills currently under consideration in the Senate include the Patent Transparency
and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); the Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013,
113th Cong. (2013); and the Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013). These
bills cover most of the same issues as the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013),
although one difference is that S. 1720 provides that certain demand-letter practices may

2014]

AGAINST SOME PATENT SETTLEMENTS

405

already held some hearings but is currently scheduling additional
ones to explore the concerns of universities, small inventors, and
others for whom the proposed legislation may have unexpected
consequences not adequately considered by the House. 210
C. Patent Settlements Deprive the Public of Decisional Law
A common observation about patent litigation is that it is
unpredictable. Some theorize that this unpredictability increases the
likelihood of settlement, 211 while others contend that unpredictability
actually diminishes that likelihood since parties overestimate their
chance of success on the merits. 212 Whatever impact unpredictability
has on settlement, the somewhat ironic fact remains that
unpredictability in patent law is caused, at least in part, by settlement
itself.
Much criticism of settlement has focused on the theory that
settlement deprives society of judicial precedent, thereby allowing
legal norms to remain in flux and litigation outcomes to be
unpredictable. 213 This criticism is particularly apt in the patent
context, where development of the law is heavily dependent on the
courts. 214 Although Congress recently passed comprehensive patent
reform with the America Invents Act, legislative action in the patent
arena historically has been the exception, not the rule.215 Instead,
constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice. See infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the recent
scrutiny of widespread distribution of cease-and-desist letters)
210. Scott A. McKeown, Senate to Schedule Additional Hearings on Leahy Patent Reform
Bill, http://perma.ccl7LA-MGQU (patentspostgrant.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014); Tony Dutra,
Senate Patent Litigation Reform Hearing Calls for More Deliberate Approach than House,
http://perma.cc/HW43-SUF7 (bna.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
211. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 54 (2003) (statement of
David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corp.), available at http://perma.cc/X8PN-2RYN
('This unpredictable legal environment has encouraged legitimate companies threatened by
patent trolls to pay large settlements . . . ."); Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability
Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 474-75 (2012) ("Perhaps the uncertainty of outcome is enough to
cause risk-averse parties to settle rather than chance a bad outcome.").
212. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Rader, J., dissenting in part) (describing how parties calculate, and often overestimate, their
chances of prevailing on the merits, which reduces the likelihood of settlement).
213. See supra Part II.B (discussing criticism of settlement).
214. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Supreme Court and the Future of Patent Reform, FED.
LAw., Feb. 2008, at 35, 39 ("[E]ven though patent law is a creature of statute, much of the actual
legal landscape has been constructed by decades of court decisions, in common-law-like
fashion.").
215. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also
Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: CapturingPrivate Information for Public Benefit, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2012) (arguing that the AIA is a watered-down version of prior reform efforts).
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decisional law, specifically Federal Circuit jurisprudence, has
primarily formed and defined the patent landscape. 216
Yet when patent suits settle, as the vast majority do, little to
no decisional law is created for future litigants. The case may be
settled early in the litigation, before the judge has rendered any
substantive decisions. Or suppose the parties reach a settlement after
the court has issued an opinion on, say, claim construction; the parties
will usually make the settlement conditional on the court granting
vacatur. 217 Either way, the upshot is that legal and factual questions
are left unresolved, giving rise to repeat litigation that drains society's
resources. 218
For the parties to the lawsuit, on the other hand, this
uncertainty may actually prove advantageous:
[A] settlement of patent litigation is not so much a determination of the parties' rights to
patented technology as it is a technique for preserving uncertainty regarding the patent
rights at issue. That uncertainty is of value both to the patentee and to the alleged
infringer if the patent is in fact invalid, because the settlement allows them both
219
privileged access to the market.

With few exceptions, parties have carte blanche to decide whether or
not to settle a patent case, despite the potential adverse impact on the
public. 220 Even more troubling, the confidentiality surrounding the

216. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 544 (2010) (stating that patent law "has traditionally had a common
law feel to it"); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 53 (2010) (noting that common law is "the dominant legal force in the development of U.S.
patent law").

217. Jeremy W. Bock, An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement-Related Motions for Vacatur
in Patent Cases, 88 IND. L.J. 919, 921-22 (2013); see also infra Part V (discussing the various
ways courts facilitate and encourage patent settlements).
218. See Luban, supra note 62, at 2622-23 (noting that settlement fails to create rules and
precedents); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 62, at 19 (arguing that lack of rules and
precedents might lead to arbitrariness in courts). While many patent cases turn on claim
construction, which is often case specific, decisional law on claim construction will still lead to
better predictability and fewer patent suits in many circumstances. See, e.g., Omega Eng'g, Inc.
v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that generally "the same claim
term in the same patent or related patents carries the same construed meaning"); Mycogen Plant
Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of claim construction in actions involving different but related

patents), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002).
219. Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and
Holdups, 50 Hous. L. REV. 483, 498 (2012).
220. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-63 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012))
(requiring the filing of certain pharmaceutical patent-settlement agreements with the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ")); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (holding that reverse payment patent settlement must be analyzed for
antitrust compliance pursuant to the rule of reason).
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terms of these settlement agreements makes any sort of ex post
scrutiny close to impossible.
D. Patent Settlements Are Shrouded in Secrecy
As in other areas of civil law, settlements in patent cases are
generally confidential. 221 Secret patent settlements are problematic,
first, because they insulate invalid patents from further challenge.
Take, for instance, the situation where the patent owner settles for a
nominal amount. 22 2 If publicly available, such settlements might
signal to other competitors that the patent is weak and vulnerable to
attack. 223 But by keeping the terms secret, patent owners are able to
create false impressions about the strength of their patents. 224
In a similar vein, patent owners can leverage these secret
settlements to their advantage in dealings with other accused
infringers. Prior settlements tend to make patents appear stronger
and more valuable, thus inducing future licensees to pay higher
royalties. 225 This proves true even for de minimis settlements: because
the terms are confidential, the licensee has no way of knowing how
much the earlier settlement was worth.
Keeping patent settlements secret also distorts damages
awards in those cases that do proceed to trial. 226 Patent owners who
prove infringement are entitled to reasonable royalties, lost profits, or
some combination of the two. 227 With the rise of PAEs, reasonable
royalties have become the predominant measure of damages in patent
cases, since a nonpracticing entity cannot recover lost profits. 228
Reasonable royalties typically are determined based on a hypothetical
negotiation between the parties at the time the infringement began. 229
To decide what royalty rate such a hypothetical negotiation would

221. See supra Part II.B (discussing the trend to keep settlements confidential).

222. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 370-71 (2012) (discussing patent cases with settlement demands
as low as $5,000 to $10,000).
223. Id. at 370 (quoting defense attorneys who claim the patents in these types of cases are
"very, very weak" or "being stretched beyond belief').

224. See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 870 (2007) (explaining that confidential settlements have
been criticized for allowing defendants to conceal "serious misdeeds").
225. Risch, supra note 170, at 1025.
226. Love, supra note 185, at 930.
227. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
228. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
229. Id.
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have yielded, courts rely on the testimony of experts who cull data
regarding similar license agreements. 230 One problem with this
approach, however, is that the data on which these experts rely are
limited because so many patent license agreements result from
settlement of litigation and are therefore confidential. 231 Often, the
only publicly available data comes from federal securities law filings
in which a party must disclose a license or settlement that is
"material" to its bottom line. 232 This skews royalty information
upward because license agreements involving large sums of money are
much more likely to be deemed material. 233 In short, allowing parties
to keep their settlements secret results in a windfall for patent owners
with respect to reasonable royalty damages.
A final criticism of confidentiality provisions in patent
settlement agreements is that they hide potential antitrust violations.
Much attention has been paid in recent years to reverse payment
settlements, in which patent owners (name-brand pharmaceutical
companies) pay alleged infringers (generic pharmaceutical companies)
to drop the validity challenge and delay entry into the market. 234
These arrangements are illegal restraints on trade, so the argument
goes, because they limit competition and exceed the exclusionary scope
of the patent. 235 Originally, reverse payment settlements were kept
secret, just like typical patent settlement agreements. That changed
in 2003 when Congress mandated that all reverse payment
settlements be disclosed to the Federal Trade Commission for

230. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the
trial court "must consider licenses that are commensurate with what the defendant has
appropriated").
231. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 185, at 2021-22.
232. Id.
233. Love, supra note 185, at 909.
234. E.g., Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 283, 284-85 (2012).
235. See, e.g., id. at 285-87 (describing federal court of appeals, FTC, and DOJ approaches to
determine whether reverse settlement payments violate antitrust laws). Last year, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of how reverse payment settlement agreements should be
scrutinized from an antitrust perspective in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). Id. at
2237-38. The FTC argued that these settlements are presumptively unlawful and that courts
reviewing them should use a "quick look" antitrust analysis. Id. at 2237. The pharmaceutical
companies, on the other hand, urged the Court to affirm the Eleventh Circuit's decision that
reverse settlement agreements are immune from antitrust attack as long as their
"anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent." Id. at
2230 (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1311 (11th Cir. 2012)). The Court
rejected both positions and took a middle-ground approach, holding that reverse payment
settlements should be analyzed under the rule of reason based on the circumstances of each case.
Id. at 2237-38.
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review. 2 36 To be sure, greater transparency as to reverse payment
settlements is laudable. But, as the Supreme Court recently
acknowledged, they are not the only type of patent settlements to
raise antitrust concerns. 237 For example, parties settling a patent case
might agree to various anticompetitive terms-let's say a sham
license, a tying arrangement involving patented and nonpatented
products, or an agreement to divide the market, among others. 238 Yet
as long as such settlements avoid reverse payments between
pharmaceutical companies, they remain confidential, evade antitrust
scrutiny, and potentially harm the consuming public. 239
E. Patent Settlements Leave Litigants Dissatisfied
Dissatisfaction with the patent system has been widespread
and well documented for the past decade or so. 2 40 Possible culprits
include the poor quality of issued patents, the proliferation of PAEinitiated litigation, and the Federal Circuit's pro-patentee bias.

236. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-63 (2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012))
(requiring disclosure of agreements regarding "the manufacture, marketing, or sale" of the brand
name and generic drugs in question). Under the new postgrant review procedures created by the
AIA, parties who settle must file their settlement agreements with the PTO. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 317, 327 (2012) (requiring filing for inter partes review and postgrant review). At the parties'
request, the PTO will keep these agreements confidential unless requested by another federal
agency or a person who demonstrates good cause. Id. This raises the question whether the FTC
or some other federal agency might start reviewing patent settlements outside the reverse
payment context. See Robert G. Sterne et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance
Procedures, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 27, 43-44 (2012) (questioning whether the FTC should review
settlement agreements in high-stakes postgrant and inter partes review proceedings).
237. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 ("[T]his Court's precedents make clear that patentrelated settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.").
238. See, e.g., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(describing tying and postexpiration royalties); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 15, at 1721
(discussing forms of out-of-court settlements and corresponding antitrust concerns).
239. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2243 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that settlements outside
the Hatch-Waxman context are private agreements that are not publicly available); Christina
Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905,
928-44 (2010) (describing anticompetitive problems posed by patent settlement agreements);
Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1048 (2004) (discussing lack of "red flags" with conventional patent
settlements).
240. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT

IT (Princeton Univ. Press, 2004) (discussing how changes made to the patent system starting in
1982 encourage frivolous litigation and hinders innovation); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K.
Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95
GEO. L.J. 269, 276-78 (2007) (discussing how the patent examination process fails to serve the
patent system's economic goals).
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Though it's impossible to pinpoint the exact source of this discontent,
the settlement phenomenon has surely been a contributing factor.
Defendants in patent cases are undoubtedly unhappy in the
first instance because they have been named in a lawsuit. The mere
fact of patent litigation spells trouble for defendants; it diverts
resources from research and development, and it distracts key
personnel from their core responsibilities. 241 What is worse than the
expense and aggravation of patent litigation, though, is the outcome
for many defendants-namely, forced settlement with the patent
owner. As previously discussed, accused infringers often have no
choice but to settle because the cost to litigate is simply too high. 24 2
This inadequate opportunity to participate in the adjudicative process
can leave defendants feeling dissatisfied with the patent system as a
whole. 2 43 And while accused infringers lodge most of the complaints
about forced patent settlements, patent owners sometimes feel
pressure to settle too. For patent owners, however, that pressure
usually comes from the court.
V. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN PATENT SETTLEMENTS

Historically, the role of federal judges in civil litigation was
quite limited. Judges were passive adjudicators who waited to hear
from the parties about whether the case was settling or proceeding to
trial. 2 4 4 Over time, the role of federal judges has morphed. Where
judges once functioned as umpires, they now look more like managers,
or even players. 245 Today's federal judges involve themselves in all
aspects of litigation, including settlement. Indeed, judges in complex,
high-stakes suits, including patent cases, are even more likely to

241. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5-6 (2003), available at http://perma.ccIF5P3-CCQB.
242. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that patent settlements are often coerced). In an interview
with the New York Times, the general counsel of Rackspace, a cloud-storage company that has
been a target of PAEs, explained that his company is bucking the trend and choosing to litigate
rather than settle. "The game is to extort license fees out of companies for less than defense
costs.... We don't want to encourage that behavior. We'll just continue to be sued until we
demonstrate that we can't be pushed into settlement." David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An
Alert to CorporateAmerica, http://perma.cc/D6E3-UDGV (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
243. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 166
("[S]ettlements deny litigants a 'day in court' and thus may feel unsatisfying.").
244. Chayes, supra note 83, at 1285; Resnick, supra note 84, at 376.

245. Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking CooperationAmong Judges in Mass Tort Litigation,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1869 (1997).
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actively encourage settlements that avoid prolonged litigation and
trial. 246
To say there is a strong judicial preference for settlement of
patent cases is to put it mildly. Besides individual trial judges
facilitating patent settlements, the federal courts have taken a
247
number of institutional measures to further this objective. What is
more, the Federal Circuit has developed a prosettlement
jurisprudence that permeates patent law. 2 4 8 But all the while, few
appear to be asking the obvious question: Is settlement really the best
way to resolve all patent cases?
A. Trial Judges Encourage Patent Settlements
There has been extensive media coverage of the high-tech
249
patent wars over smartphones and tablets. The short of it is that
Apple has sued a number of competitors, including Samsung,
Motorola, HTC, and others, for patent infringement in courts around
the world. 250 While Apple's campaign has been far-reaching and
aggressive, the prime reason these lawsuits garnered so much
attention is because they were not settled and were heading for
trial.251 Apparently, Apple's strategy was framed by its late CEO,
Steve Jobs, who was unwilling to settle because of his firm belief that
Apple had been wronged. 252 In Fiss's terms, Apple was seeking justice
rather than peace.
246. Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 367, 383-84 (2008) ("M'[1Iegacases' have forced an expansion in the role of the judge from
simply presiding over traditional litigation to more active participation in mediating global
solutions."); Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot
Program's Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 230
(2009) ("A judge that does not like patent cases may more strongly encourage a settlement
between the parties to avoid a lengthy and complicated litigation.").
247. See infra Part V.B (discussing the steps courts have taken to promote settlement).
248. See infra Part V.C (discussing the Federal Circuit's prosettlement case law).
249. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword,
http://perma.cc/WJ5E-KVZN (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014) (discussing how companies file
numerous lawsuits to prevent competition); Glenn G. Lammi, 'Tis the Season for More
Smartphone 'PatentWar' Court Rulings, http://perma.cc/T49P-UATW (forbes.com, archived Feb.
1, 2014) (discussing important recent decisions in "the patent wars."); Smartphone Cases Caught
Up in Patent Wars, http://perma.cc/FD3X-GCT3 (chicagotribune.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014)
(describing the rise in litigation over smartphone cases).
250. Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 249.
251. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple and Samsung Trade Jabs in Court,
http://perma.ce/4KM3-R6TT (wsj.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014) (describing in detail the opening
statements of one such trial and noting the crowd that gathered in the courthouse).
252. See WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 1 (2011). According to Steve Jobs' biographer,
Walter Isaacson, Jobs accused Google of "grand theft" and said he was "willing to go to
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From the beginning, Apple's litigation plan was met with
resistance, especially from the trial judges assigned to these cases.
Consider, for example, Judge Lucy Koh, who presided over the Apple,
Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. case in the Northern District of
California. Early on in the litigation, Judge Koh reminded Apple
and Samsung about their $7 billion business relationship and
lightheartedly asked, "Can we all just get along here and can I send
you out to ADR? . . . I will send you with boxes of chocolates." 253 But as
the case progressed and still was not settled, Judge Koh grew
impatient. During one pretrial hearing, she expressed frustration with
the parties for insufficiently narrowing the issues for trial.2 54 She went
so far as to say that it would be "cruel and unusual punishment" for a
jury to have to decide a case so complex. 25 Even after the trial was
underway, Judge Koh ordered Apple and Samsung to try once more to
resolve the dispute, because in her words, it was "time for peace." 256
Despite these efforts, Apple v. Samsung proceeded to a jury, and Apple
was awarded more than $1 billion in damages. Judge Koh continued
to urge settlement postverdict, telling the parties that "global peace"
would be "good for consumers and good for the industry."257 So far,
though, the parties have stuck to their guns and are letting this
matter resolve itself through the adjudicative process. Indeed, as a
result of Judge Koh's decision to reduce the initial $1.05 billion
verdict, a partial retrial was held in late 2014,258 and another trial on
related products is scheduled to begin this March. Judge Koh has still
not given up on settlement, however, and the parties recently agreed

thermonuclear war" against Google and others for "ripp[ing] off the iPhone." Id. Jobs reportedly
also said, "I will spend my last dying breath if I need to, and I will spend every penny of Apple's
$40 billion in the bank, to right this wrong. I'm going to destroy Android, because it's a stolen
product." Id.
253. Transcript of Proceedings at 16:10-21, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.5:11-cv01846-LHK, (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2011).
254. Id. at 3:19-4:8.
255. Id. ("But it's simply not going to be possible for one jury to do ... 16 utility patents, six
design patents, five trade dresses, six trademarks, an anti-trust case and about 37 accused
devices."). Later, when Apple submitted an unusually long brief naming more than twenty
potential rebuttal witnesses, Judge Koh asked Apple's lawyers if they were "smoking crack."
Josh Lowensohn, Judge Says Apple's "Smoking Crack" with Giant Witness List,
http://perma.cclYJ8X-EMMM (cnet.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
256. Judge Urges Apple and Samsung to Settle Their Patent Dispute, http://perma.ccl7YR36BQG (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
257. Natasha Lomas, Apple vs. Samsung: Judge Koh Makes Pleafor "Global Peace" as Pair
Muster Latest Rounds of Legal Arguments, http://perma.cclZ69S-6LSE (techcrunch.com, archived
Feb. 1, 2014).
258. See supra note 198 (explaining that Apple was awarded $290 million at the retrial,
bringing the current damages total to about $935 million).
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(at the court's urging) to try mediation. 259 Yet if past behavior is any
predictor of future behavior, then Apple and Samsung are likely to
end up back in court fighting it out.260
Apple's take-no-prisoners strategy has not fared as well in
other courts. When Apple's case against Motorola failed to settle and
was on the brink of trial, Judge Posner (sitting by designation in the
Northern District of Illinois) instead dismissed the case. 261 In this
unprecedented decision, which both parties have appealed, Judge
Posner held that the parties were not entitled to proceed to trial
because they had adduced insufficient evidence of patent injury. 262
Interestingly, Judge Posner first issued his decision on a tentative
basis, 26 3 perhaps hoping to spur settlement, but the parties stayed the
course toward trial. And so literally on the eve of trial, Judge Posner
converted his tentative order to final and dismissed the case with
prejudice. 264
Worse yet, at least from a Fissian perspective, Apple
announced a global settlement with HTC in late 2012, marking a
sharp reversal of its former litigation strategy. 265 It's impossible to
know precisely what motivated Apple's decision to change direction. 266
Some believe that Apple's current CEO, Tim Cook, simply does not
share his predecessor's antisettlement position. 267 Public opinion also
may have prompted Apple's shift in strategy, as consumers

259. Chris O'Brien, Apple, Samsung Agree to Try Mediation in Patent Disputes,
http://perma.cclL5S3-QRQJ (latimes.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
260. See Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple-Samsung Mediation Talks: Don't Hold Your Breath,
http://perma.cc/NU5H-9LN7 (cnn.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
261. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2012) (opinion and
order for dismissal), availableat http://perma.cc/9JPV-4MGS.
262. Id. The Federal Circuit heard oral argument in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. on
September 11, 2013, but it has not yet issued a decision in the case.
263. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012) (tentative order
for dismissal), availableat http://perma.cclHGY8-KAB9.
264. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2012) (opinion and
order for dismissal), availableat http://perma.cc/T4BS-4RCF.
265. Ian Sherr, Apple, HTC Settle PatentDispute, Sign Licensing Pact,http://perma.cc/LS7T8XRY (wsj.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014).
266. See John R. Allison, Emerson H. Tiller & Samantha Zyontz, Patent Litigation and the
Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 55 ("As with the decision to institute patent litigation in
the first place, the decision to settle is a complex one affected by countless factors, most of which
are undiscoverable or at least unmeasurable.").
267. See, e.g., Tim Culpan & Adam Satariano, Apple Settles HTC Patent Suits Shifting from
Jobs' War, http://perma.ccDZ28-EMK4 (bloomberg.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014) ("For as long as
Tim Cook has been CEO, Apple has been less interested in pursuing legal assaults against
competitors, choosing increasingly to find ways to settle differences out of court." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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increasingly questioned the value of these lawsuits. 268 Finally, and
most importantly for purposes of this Article, Apple felt heavy
pressure from the courts to settle these disputes as quickly as
possible. 269
While courts may be a bit more emboldened to push for
settlement in massive, high-profile suits like Apple's, 270 it is the norm
in patent litigation for trial judges to encourage and facilitate
settlement. There are a whole host of reasons why a trial judge might
prefer settlement of patent cases. Starting with the obvious, patent
cases are generally time consuming and unwieldy, which means that
courts spend a disproportionate amount of time managing them.271 For
a trial judge who wants to control her calendar and docket, purging all
patent cases would certainly be a step in the right direction.
Moreover, even as compared to other types of complex
litigation, judges may be particularly motivated to settle patent cases
due to the heightened challenges they pose both from a factual and
legal perspective. Patent cases generally involve highly complicated
technology that federal judges may feel they, and certainly lay jurors,
are not qualified to handle. 272 Just to understand the facts of these
cases, judges frequently appoint special masters, experts, or other
technical specialists with knowledge in the relevant field. 2 7 3 Nor do

268. See, e.g., Erik Kain, Samsung Takes a Jab at Apple in the Court of Public Opinion,
http://perma.cclKC4J-9W3W (forbes.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014) (suggesting that Samsung's
commercial mocking Apple's iPhone 5 tapped into public frustration with patent suits).

269. Roger

Cheng,

Judge Tells Apple

and HTC

to

Start Talking Settlement,

http://perma.cc/7JXA-CEJC (cnet.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014); Culpan & Satariano, supra note
267 ("A separate case before the ITC may have forced Cook to the negotiating table after a judge
said Apple probably would face difficulty getting a series of HTC patents invalidated.").

270. See also Settlement Reached in BlackBerry Patent Case, http://perma.cclYA52-81VYC
(nbcnews.com, archived Feb. 1, 2014) (explaining that the trial judge "expressed impatience with
RIM and urged settlement").
271. 155 Cong. Rec. 3457 (2009) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("Patent litigation is too
expensive, too time-consuming, and too unpredictable.").
272. See, e.g., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Settlement
is of particular value in patent litigation, the nature of which is often inordinately complex and
time consuming.").
273. See FED. R. EviD. 706(a) ("The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on
and any of its own choosing."); Marilyn L. Huff, Developments in the Jurisprudenceon the Use of
Experts, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 325, 328-29 (2012) ("The technical complexity of many
patent claims may lead trial judges to seek the assistance of court-appointed experts, special
masters, or technical advisors for assistance in the case."); see also JAY P. KESAN & GWENDOLYN
G. BALL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A STUDY OF THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN PATENT
CASES (2009), available at http://perma.ccKAC7-JFXE (discussing the appointment and role of
special masters in patent litigation and noting their use "in areas where their technical skills
and training will allow them to evaluate evidence, to determine how it should be collected, or to
determine how patent claims should be construed").
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the facts of patent cases tend to repeat, leaving judges to reinvent the
wheel with each case. 274
But it's not only the facts of patent cases that are difficult, it's
the law too. Many areas of patent doctrine are muddled or confused,
which makes the possibility of trial especially daunting. 275 So to avoid
a judge or jury having to decide thorny issues of infringement,
invalidity, and damages, trial courts regularly promote settlement of
patent cases. Indeed, some courts have moved beyond encouragement,
prodding, and pressure and have put into place institutional measures
to maximize settlement outcomes.
B. InstitutionalMeasures Encourage Patent Settlements
In recent years, there has been an exponential rise in patent
litigation concentrated in a small number of federal judicial districts
throughout the country. 276 Courts with heavy patent dockets have
implemented institutional controls to manage these complex suits, the
most notable of which is the adoption of local patent rules.2 77 In 2000,
the Northern District of California was the first to adopt local patent
rules. Since then, almost thirty districts have followed in its
footsteps. 278 Even some districts without significant patent dockets
have adopted these local rules, perhaps as a way of enticing plaintiffs
to file patent suits there. 279
274. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1109, 1128-29 (2010).
275. See, e.g., Edwards Lifesciences AG v. Corevalve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("Some complain of areas of patent law in which our guidance is mixed or muddled.").

276. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401
(2010) (analyzing factors that attribute to a judicial district's popularity as a forum for patent
litigation).

277. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalismand PatentLaw Reform, 85 IND. L.J.
449, 476-77 (2010) (listing a number of districts that have adopted a form of local patent rules).
The Central District of California, however, has not adopted local patent rules, even though it is
the largest judicial district in the country with a very busy patent docket. See Craig Anderson,

Central District Struggles in Its Role as Top Patent Venue, SUPPLEMENT TO L.A. & S.F. DAILY J.
(Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://perma.cc/EF4N-LGJY (discussing how the Central District of
California's refusal to adopt local patent rules both increases its load of patent litigation and
creates uncertainty).

278. Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local Patent Rules-Certainty and Efficiency or a Crazy Quilt of
Substantive Law?, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS 94, 94 (2012). District courts
promulgate these local rules pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 83, yet some have questioned whether
these local rules conform with either Rule 83 or the Rules Enabling Act. See Tyco Fire Prods. LP
v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ("Using local patent rules to alter a
defendant's pleading obligations ... offends the trans-substantive character of federal
procedure."); Gollwitzer, supra, at 265 (discussing how local patent rules may give rise to
substantive differences in case outcomes across districts).
279. E.g., D. NEV. Civ. PRAC. R. 16.1-1; W.D. TENN, PATENT R. 1.1.
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Local patent rules aim to standardize, streamline, and speed
up patent cases by forcing parties early on in litigation to disclose
their infringement and invalidity contentions. 280 This means quicker
discovery deadlines and less time to develop case theories and
strategies. 281 While speeding up some aspects of litigation, local patent
rules have slowed down others-namely, Markman hearings. 282 The
usual trend is to defer Markman hearings to the end of fact discovery
so that the parties' positions on claim construction will be better
defined and so that the court will only have to construe the most
relevant disputed terms. 283 The natural corollary of these timing
requirements, whether intended or not, is to increase settlement rates
in patent cases. 284
Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Texas has aptly
described this relationship between local patent rules and settlement:
While the Court will not comment on Plaintiffs strategy, when combined with the
requirements of the Patent Rules and the Court's standard docket control order,
Plaintiffs strategy presents Defendants with a Hobson's choice: spend more than the
settlement range on discovery, or settle for what amounts to cost of defense, regardless
28 5
of whether a Defendant believes it has a legitimate defense.

In a separate case, Judge Davis expressed related concerns about
plaintiffs who file cases with extremely weak infringement positions in
order to settle for less than the cost of defense and who have no
intention of taking the case to trial. Such a practice is an abuse of the
judicial system and threatens the integrity of and respect for the
courts. 286 In those situations, Judge Davis believes, local patent rules
"may not provide the most efficient case management schedule." 287
Accordingly, Judge Davis has been willing to modify the deadlines and
280. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction:A Modern Synthesis and Structured
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 788-90 (2010).
281. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. 6:10-CV-591, 2011 WL 1980214, at *1
(E.D. Tex. May 20, 2011) (noting that, in some situations, patent rules' "quick discovery
deadlines" enable abuse of the judicial system); McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
495 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("The Local Patent Rules have been characterized as
an exercise in forced door closing, in the sense that they force the parties to take infringement
and invalidity positions early in the litigation and stick to them." (internal quotations omitted)).
282. Menell et al., supra note 280, at 792.
283. Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., Circuit Judges Panel of the
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Leadership Conference (Feb. 18, 2006) (stating preference for claim
construction to occur as late in the proceeding as possible).
284. See Uniloc, 2011 WL 1980214, at *1 (discussing how bringing questionable patent
claims may motivate settlements).
285. Parallel Networks LLC v. AEO, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-00111-LED, at 6-7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15,
2011) (internal quotations omitted) (order denying motion to bifurcate).
286. Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Co., No. 6:09-cv-00355-LED, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
2009) (order denying motion for sanctions).
287. Uniloc, 2011 WL 1980214, at *1.
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disclosure requirements imposed by his court's local patent rules as
appropriate on a case-by-case basis. 288
Besides Judge Davis, few trial judges seem concerned about
local patent rules coercing parties (particularly defendants) into
unjustified settlements.289 To the contrary, most district courts strictly
interpret and enforce their local patent rules, a practice the Federal
Circuit has approved. 290 More to the point, courts have adopted local
patent rules that include specific provisions designed to promote
settlement. For example, the Southern District of California and the
District of Nevada have both promulgated local patent rules
mandating settlement conferences. 291 In the same vein, the Western
District of Tennessee has adopted local patent rules that require
parties to identify disputed claim terms whose construction would be
"substantially conducive to promoting settlement." 292 These
prosettlement local rules arguably will attract patent plaintiffs who
have no intention of adjudicating a case to trial but instead are
seeking quick, lucrative settlements.
The movement to adopt local patent rules is not the only
institutional action the judiciary has taken to encourage out-of-court
patent settlements. In 2006, the Federal Circuit established a
mandatory mediation program for all cases selected for participation,
including patent appeals. 293 The mediation program's purpose is to
288. See, e.g., Raylon, No.147 6:09-cv-00355-LED, at 5 (order denying motion for sanctions);
Adjustacam LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 426 6:10-cv-00329-LED (E.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2010)
(order denying motion to stay and to sever claims, and granting parties' request for leave to file
an early summary judgment motion regarding damages).
289. Congress, on the other hand, was somewhat concerned with this problem and enacted
stricter joinder requirements for patent cases as part of the America Invents Act. 35 U.S.C. § 299
(2012). Under prior joinder rules, patent owners could sue multiple unrelated defendants in the
same action as long as they were alleged to have infringed on the same patent. See David 0.
Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 671 (2013). Congress apparently believed that
these liberal joinder rules increased costs for defendants, pressuring them into premature
settlements. Id. at 701-02.
290. See, e.g., 02 Micro Int'l. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in strictly enforcing local patent
rules); Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that it "defers
to the district court when interpreting and enforcing local rules so as not to frustrate local
attempts to manage patent cases according to prescribed guidelines").

291. See W. West Allen, Nevada Federal Court: The Next Best Place for Patent Litigation?,
NEV. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 9-10 (explaining that the District of Nevada requires three
mandatory
settlement
conferences
held at strategic
stages
of the
litigation:
pre-claim construction, post-claim construction, and pretrial); Douglas C. Muth et al., The Local
Patent Rules Bandwagon, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 19, 21 (2009) (describing the Southern
District of California's requirement for an early settlement conference).
292. W.D. TENN. PATENT R. 4.5(C).

293. David E. Sosnowski, Resolving Patent Disputes Via Mediation: The Federal Circuit and
the ITC Find Success, MD. B.J., Mar. 2012, at 26. The Federal Circuit initially rolled this out as a
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help settle cases by providing a confidential, nonbinding, no-cost
opportunity for parties to discuss their dispute with a mediator who
has expertise in the relevant field. 294 Between 2007 and 2013, there
were 497 patent cases selected for participation in the mediation
program, and on average, 45% of those cases settled. 295 If success is
defined as settling cases-which it clearly is for the Federal Circuitthen this mediation program has been quite successful for patent
appeals over the past several years. 296
To be sure, the Federal Circuit's mediation program has
increased the settlement rate of patent cases. In reality, though, the
mediation program's impact on patent settlements is infinitesimal
when compared to other ways the Federal Circuit has influenced
settlement. Specifically, over the past thirty years, the Federal Circuit
has developed a prosettlement jurisprudence that has conveyed to
lower courts, litigants, and market participants that settlement is
always the preferred way to resolve patent disputes.
C. The FederalCircuit's ProsettlementJurisprudence
Federal Circuit jurisprudence has been the topic of much
scholarly debate. Scholars have explored the Federal Circuit's propatentee bias, 297 inclination toward formalism, 298 and propensity for

voluntary mediation program in 2005 but made it mandatory when the program was formally
implemented a year later. Id.
294. U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES (2008),

available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/mediation/guidelines.html; Wendy Levenson Dean,
Let's Make a Deal: Negotiating Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes Through Mandatory
Mediation at the Federal Circuit, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 366 (2007).
295. U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE STATISTICS (2007),
available at http://perma.cc/4VAV-Y4YV; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION
OFFICE STATISTICS (2008), available at http://perma.cc/Z896-342Q; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED.
CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE STATISTICS (2009), available at http://perma.cclW6NL3QNU; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE STATISTICS (2010),
available at http://perma.cc/3WL2-Y3BH; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION
OFFICE STATISTICS (2011), available at http://perma.cc/L4ZF-PA3D; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED.
CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE STATISTICS (2012), available at http://perma.cc/X5WEKY48; U.S. COURT OF APP. FED. CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT MEDIATION OFFICE STATISTICS (2013),
available at http://perma.cc/5BLN-92EM.
296. See supra Part V.C (discussing the Federal Circuit's preference for settlement).
297. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 115, at 69 (describing empirical research that
shows a link between growth of patent applications and pro-patent-holder policies in the Federal
Circuit); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 11026 (2004) (explaining systematic alterations in favor of patent holders, including strengthening
remedies, expanding patentable topics, limiting challenges to patent validity, and increasing
reliance on juries).
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turning questions of fact into questions of law.2 99 One subject that has
received surprisingly little attention, however, is the Federal Circuit's
prosettlement ideology, which pervades the court's patent law
jurisprudence.
1. Patent Validity Challenges and Settlement
When the PTO issues a bad patent, federal court adjudication
is usually the only way to rectify that mistake.300 Because of the
impact bad patents may have on the consuming public, the Supreme
Court consistently has taken the position that validity challenges
must be facilitated and encouraged. 301 To that end, the Court in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins abolished the doctrine of licensee estoppel, which
precluded licensees from challenging the validity of patents subject to
license agreements. 302 The Court reasoned that "[1]icensees may often
be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge
the patentability of an inventor's discovery."303

298. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1790
(2011) ("Poor policy arising from legal formalism is especially commonplace in Federal Circuit
patent cases."); John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability,51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 609, 611-12 (2009) (describing how Federal Circuit overruled a prior doctrinal test
and adopted the "machine-or-transformation" rule instead of a more flexible standard); John R.
Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 776 (2003) (explaining
"adjudicative rule formalism," according to which lawmakers are encouraged to make bright-line
rules instead of vague standards).
299. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 766, 781 (2008) (reasoning that the Federal
Circuit's tendency to change questions of fact into questions of law leads to quality and accuracy
issues); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791,
1832 (2013) (arguing that, although evaluating extrinsic claim construction evidence seems to be
a fact-finding task, the Federal Circuit treats it as a question of law); Arti K. Rai, Specialized
Trial Courts: ConcentratingExpertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 887, 894 (2002) (noting
how the Federal Circuit has declared claim construction to be a pure question of law and thus
subject to de novo review).
300. Farell & Merges, supra note 168, at 958. Pursuant to the AIA, Congress has created
additional administrative procedures for challenging patent validity. See Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered parts
of 35 U.S.C.). However, there are limitations to these proceedings, so litigation will likely remain
the primary gatekeeper of patent validity. La Belle, supra note 153, at 57-59.
301. See FTC v. Activis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) (recognizing the "patent-related
policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will not continually be required to
pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification" (internal quotations omitted));
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345-46 (1971) (discussing line of
Supreme Court cases that "eliminat[ed] obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the
validity of a patent"); see also La Belle, supra note 153, at 62-63 (describing how the Court in
Lear recognized the crucial nature of the public's right to access the public domain).
302. 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
303. Id. at 670.
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In the wake of Lear, parties and courts have struggled to define
the decision's reach. Of particular concern has been Lear's impact on
"no-challenge" clauses, which are provisions in patent licenses and
settlement agreements acknowledging the validity of the patent and
precluding future validity challenges. 304 While courts and scholars
agree that Lear likely bars no-challenge provisions in standard patent
license agreements, the analysis is more complicated when a lawsuit
(actual or potential) is involved.
Courts first addressed the question whether settlement
agreements with no-challenge provisions are enforceable under Lear
with respect to cases resolved through the entry of a consent decree. 305
Courts have uniformly answered this question in the affirmative, but
their rationales have varied. The Second Circuit, for example, found
persuasive the argument that consent decrees are subject to court
scrutiny (unlike license agreements) and are entered into only after
the accused infringer conducts discovery. 306 By contrast, the Federal
Circuit in Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co. relied on policies
favoring the finality of judgments and voluntary settlement in
deciding to enforce no-challenge provisions in consent decrees:
"Barring subsequent challenges favors the public policy of encouraging
voluntary settlement; at the same time, a narrow construction of [nochallenge] provisions favors challenges to validity. Thus, a balance in
the policy expressed in Lear and the interest in encouraging
settlement is achieved." 307
Had the Federal Circuit actually gone on to construe nochallenge provisions narrowly, perhaps the right balance might have
been struck. But that is not what has happened since Foster. Instead,
the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cited the policy encouraging

304. See Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425, 42526 (9th Cir. 1971) (describing how the district court struggled with defining a breach of the
settlement agreement as a breach-of-contract or a patent-infringement claim).
305. See, e.g., Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[A] consent
judgment, unlike an imposed judgment, runs afoul of Lear even with respect to the same cause of
action ... on the theory that Lear precludes parties from removing possible challenges to validity
merely by their agreement."); Am. Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544, 547-48 (7th
Cir. 1980) (noting that the impact of Lear on "whether consent judgment adjudicating
infringement as well as validity of the patent has not yet been decided by this court" (internal
quotations omitted)); Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir.
1976) (concluding that consent decrees were subject to court scrutiny unlike pre-Lear estoppel
claims based on purely private license agreements); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d
775, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1975) (describing a circuit split regarding how to treat Lear with respect to
consent decrees).
306. Wallace Clark, 532 F.2d at 849.
307. Foster, 947 F.2d at 481.
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settlement to "chip[ ] away at" the Lear doctrine. 308 In Flex-Foot, Inc.
v. CRP, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that Lear does not void private
settlement agreements with no-challenge provisions, even in the
absence of a consent decree. 309 As the court explained,
Once an accused infringer has challenged patent validity, has had an opportunity to
conduct discovery on validity issues, and has elected to voluntarily dismiss the litigation
with prejudice under a settlement agreement containing a clear and unambiguous
undertaking not to challenge validity . .. the accused infringer is contractually estopped
3 10
from raising any such challenge in any subsequent proceeding.

Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded, "settlement
of litigation is more strongly favored" than Lear.311
Flex-Foot left open the question whether no-challenge
provisions in settlement agreements would only be enforced in cases
where the accused infringer challenged patent validity and had the
opportunity to engage in meaningful discovery. 312 Let's consider the
situation where a patentee sues for infringement, the parties settle
very quickly before any discovery has taken place, and the defendant
agrees to a no-challenge provision. Is that no-challenge provision
enforceable even though the accused infringer did not have "an
opportunity to conduct discovery on validity issues" like the defendant
in Flex-Foot? In the years immediately following Flex-Foot, some
scholars concluded that such a no-challenge provision would be
enforceable because Flex-Foot stood for the broad proposition that a
clear and unambiguous promise not to challenge the validity of a
patent will be enforced as long as it forms part of an agreement to
settle litigation.313 Other scholars argued that such an extensive
application of Flex-Foot would cut too far into Lear's holding because

308. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 15, at 1743 n.99.
309. 238 F.3d 1362, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d
348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding the district court's settlement order dismissing litigation
and stating that validity issues were finally resolved and bar a later challenge to validity under
estoppel principles).
310. Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370 (emphasis added).
311. Id. at 1369.
312. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent

Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1780
(2003) (arguing that the Flex-Foot rule should only apply when defendant has conducted
discovery because, "[p]resumably, such discovery is likely to reveal much about probable patent
invalidity").
313. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1142 (2d ed. 2001) ("[A] promise
not to challenge the validity of a patent will be enforced if it is in a contract of a certain type,
which presently includes settlement agreements."); see also Hovenkamp et al., supra note 15, at
1739 n.99 (stating that, after Flex-Foot, the Lear doctrine "does not permit a licensee who once
challenged a patent's validity and settled that lawsuit to reopen the challenge").
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"the public also benefits from removing invalid patents from the
system." 314
The Federal Circuit recently addressed this unresolved
question in Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, and predictably, the
court continued its pattern of whittling away Lear in favor of policies
promoting settlement.315 The accused infringer in Baseload brought a
declaratory judgment action against Roberts (the patent owner),
asking the court to declare his patent invalid and unenforceable. The
district court granted summary judgment to Roberts on estoppel
grounds based on an earlier settlement agreement between the parties
that barred "all claims between the parties."316 On appeal, the accused
infringer argued that Flex-Foot did not apply because the prior
litigation and settlement concerned a breach of contract claim and did
not involve patent invalidity issues at allA' 7 The Federal Circuit
disagreed:
Contrary to [the accused infringer's] argument, while the absence of a prior dispute and
litigation as to invalidity is pertinent, we do not think that a settlement agreement is
ineffective to release invalidity claims unless the exact circumstances described in FlexFoot are present .... In the context of settlement agreements, as with consent decrees,
clear and unambiguous language barring the right to challenge patent validity in future
infringement actions is sufficient, even if invalidity claims had not been previously at

issue and had not been actually litigated.3

18

In the end, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of
summary judgment because the settlement agreement from the prior
breach-of-contract litigation did not include the necessary "clear and
unambiguous language" required of a no-challenge clause. 319
Despite the ultimate conclusion in Baseload, the above-quoted
language is telling for a number of reasons. For starters, it signals the
Federal Circuit's willingness to enforce no-challenge provisions in
quick settlements executed soon after cases are filed without any
discovery as to the patent's validity. Indeed, even before Baseload,
district courts were interpreting Flex-Foot as applying to cases where
there was little or no presettlement discovery. 320 But with Baseload,
314. O'Rourke & Brodley, supranote 299, at 1780.
315. 619 F.3d 1357, 1361-64 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
316. Id. at 1358 (internal quotations omitted).
317. Id. at 1363.
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 1364.
320. See, e.g., Warrior Lacrosse, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., No. 04-71649, 2006 WL 763190, at *26
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2006) ("[The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that the policy of
preserving the public domain articulated in Lear v. Adkins must yield in view of the strong
federal policy of promoting the settlement of litigation."); Panduit Corp. v. Hellermann Tyton
Corp., No. 03-0-8100, 2004 WL 1898954, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2004) (holding that the factors
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the Federal Circuit has taken Flex-Foot one step further. Now, the
accused infringer may be estopped even where neither patent validity
nor infringement was raised in the prior proceeding. 321
One remaining situation that the Federal Circuit has yet to
address involves a prelitigation settlement with a no-challenge
provision. Say, for instance, that a patent owner threatens an
infringement suit but that the parties settle and enter into a license
agreement before a lawsuit is ever filed. If the agreement includes a
no-challenge provision, is that treated more like the license agreement
in Lear or the settlement agreement in Flex-Foot? The Second Circuit
addressed this question recently and decided that prelitigation
settlements look more like the former and are therefore void under
Lear.322 In reaching this decision, the Second Circuit admitted to some
tension with the above-quoted language from Baseload but concluded
that the Federal Circuit's statement was dicta and that, more
importantly, the Second Circuit is not bound by the Federal Circuit. 323
The Second Circuit further stated that it "anticipates that when the
issue is squarely presented," the Federal Circuit will "carefully
consider" whether the dicta in Baseload is consistent with Lear,
which, the Second Circuit reminds the Federal Circuit, is binding on
all circuits." 324
For now, we will have to wait and see how the Federal Circuit
comes out on this issue. I must admit, though, I am less optimistic
than the Second Circuit about the Federal Circuit deferring to Lear
with respect to prelitigation settlements. I suspect instead that the
Federal Circuit will reject the Second Circuit's rule on the ground that
it will increase litigation by forcing parties who wish to settle to go
through the formality of filing suit so that their settlement agreement
is enforceable under Flex-Foot.325 Of course, more litigation is not the
set out in Flex-Foot were not intended by the Federal Circuit as a "test" for future cases, but
simply as a recitation of the facts in Flex-Foot).
321. See, e.g., Petter Invs., Inc. v. Hydro Eng'g, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 924, 929 (W.D. Mich.
2011) (finding that, to maintain a right to contractual estoppel, Flex-Foot did not require
invalidity issues to be actually litigated in the proceeding giving rise to the settlement
agreement).
322. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[Wle believe that
in the patent context enforcing no-challenge clauses in prelitigation settlements would too easily
enable patent owners to 'muzzle[' licensees-the 'only individuals with enough economic
incentive to challenge' the patent's validity." (quoting Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969))).
323. Id. at 173-74.
324. Id. at 174 n.9. Importantly, in a case decided just this January, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Lear's reasoning that patent challenges serve the public interest. See Medtronic, Inc.,
v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 852 (2014).
325. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of MedImmune Upon Both
Licensing and Litigation, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 748, 748 (2007) ("For patent
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only possible outcome of the Second Circuit's rule-parties could also
respond by settling without no-challenge provisions, which would be
"a desirable consequence for the reasons stated in Lear."3 26 Yet
because the Federal Circuit has consistently denigrated Lear in favor
of settlement, there is little reason to believe it will fall in line with
the Second Circuit on this issue. 327
2. Vacatur
Vacatur is another area of patent law where the Federal
Circuit has consistently promoted settlement without adequately
considering the impact on the public good. 328 The practice of parties
jointly moving to vacate otherwise proper rulings in connection with
settlement has become quite common in patent cases. 329 A recent
empirical study by Jeremy Bock sheds important light on this issue.
In his study, Bock gathered data from seventy-nine patent cases filed
during a five-year period (January 2006 to January 2011) in which the
parties jointly moved the trial court to vacate otherwise-proper court
rulings as part of the settlement agreement. 330 The vacatur motions in
all seventy-nine cases targeted rulings on substantive matters of
patent law, including claim construction, noninfringement, invalidity,
and unenforceability.33 1 Bock found that trial courts granted these
motions for vacatur a vast majority of the time. 332
holders . . . looking to negotiate new license agreements, the fact that license agreements
prepared and executed in the context of settlement agreements are stronger . . . may weigh in
favor of an approach of suing the potential licensee for infringement prior to negotiating the
license agreement.").
326. Rates Tech., 685 F.3d at 173.
327. Closely related to no-challenge provisions are covenants not to sue ("CNS'), pursuant to
which a patentee promises not to enforce its patent(s) against certain potential infringers. Patent
owners will often grant a CNS after litigation has been initiated in order to settle the case.
Sometimes, though, the accused infringer wants to continue litigating its invalidity claim
notwithstanding the CNS. The Federal Circuit has held, however, that the issuance of a CNS can
divest a federal court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction because there is no longer an actual
case or controversy for the court to resolve. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606
F.3d 1338, 1345-49 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This means that the validity challenge goes unresolved and the potentially
invalid patent remains in force. Although the Federal Circuit has not explicitly justified this
position on promotion-of-settlement grounds, it is likely that the court's prosettlement policy
underlies its CNS jurisprudence, at least to some degree.
328. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1254 (abridged 7th ed. 2000) (defining vacatur as "the act of
annulling or setting aside").
329. See Bock, supra note 217, at 920. Some vacatur motions are not jointly filed but are
unopposed, so the end result is the same. Id. at 953.
330. Id. at 935.
331. Id.

332. Id. at 938 (finding that courts grant 78.5% of these motions).
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To understand the import of Bock's results, it is necessary to
appreciate why parties, specifically patent owners, seek vacatur in the
first place. Generally speaking, patent owners move to vacate
judgments to avoid an estoppel effect in future litigation. If, for
instance, a patent is adjudged invalid in one suit, the patent owner
would normally be estopped from enforcing that patent in a later
suit.3 33 But if the parties settle and the trial court vacates the
judgment, then the patent owner is free to reassert the previously
invalidated patent against other competitors. 334 No doubt this practice
adversely affects the public interest, 335 yet federal district courts grant
vacatur motions in the vast majority of instances where it is requested
as part of a patent settlement. This trend is due at least in part to the
Federal Circuit's vacatur jurisprudence.
The leading Supreme Court decision on vacatur is U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership.336 In that case, the
parties settled after the Court granted certiorari and after the
petitioner moved to vacate the lower court's judgment. The Supreme
Court denied the motion, holding that vacatur is an equitable remedy
that should be used only in exceptional circumstances. 337 Because of
its equitable nature, the decision whether to grant vacatur, the Court
further explained, must take into account the public's interest. 33 8 The
Court concluded that the public's interests lie in having legal
questions resolved, and "the mere fact that the settlement agreement
provides for vacatur" does not outweigh this fundamental principle of
social welfare. 339
Despite setting a high bar for settlement-related vacatur,
Bancorp has had a diminished impact because some lower courts have
interpreted it as limited to appellate level vacatur. 340 It is true that

333. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding
that, once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent owner from
ever asserting it again).
334. Bock, supra note 217, at 958 (finding that the majority of vacatur motions pertained to
patents with a history of litigation).
335. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (noting "the
importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent validity"); Lear v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653, 675 n.19 (1969) (remarking on "the public's interest in the elimination of specious
patents").
336. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
337. Id. at 29.
338. Id. at 26-27.
339. Id. at 26-27, 29.
340. See, e.g., Marseilles Hydro Power LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 481 F.3d 1002,
1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that district courts are not "cabined by [Bancorp's] exceptional
circumstances test"); Am. Games v. Trade Prods., 142 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating
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Bancorp suggested that appellate courts should refrain from deciding
vacatur motions and should instead allow trial courts to resolve these
questions on remand. 341 What Bancorp did not make clear, however, is
whether district courts are bound by the "exceptional circumstances"
requirement or whether the standard is looser for trial courts. Federal
circuit courts have split on this issue, with some holding that Bancorp
applies at the trial level,342 while others have held that a district court
may grant settlement-related vacatur even in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. 343
Since Bancorp, the Federal Circuit has weighed in on vacatur
and encouraged its use to settle patent cases, albeit in relatively
subtle ways. 344 In Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., a case about the
preclusive effect of claim construction orders, Judge Dyk wrote a
concurring opinion addressing vacatur:
I also write separately to emphasize that our decision today does not determine that the
parties to a district court settlement agreement lack a mechanism to prevent interim
decisions in that litigation from having collateral estoppel effects in future third party
litigation. That goal could perhaps be accomplished by moving to vacate the district
court's earlier decision as part of the settlement. 34 5

Judge Dyk went on to say that Bancorp does not apply to district
courts "but rather only to the Supreme Court and to courts of
appeals."346
Judge Dyk's recommended approach has become prevalent in
patent litigation. As Bock's study reflects, parties regularly move the
trial court to vacate adverse rulings upon settlement, and those

that district courts, in granting vacatur, are not bound by Bancorp's exceptional circumstances
test).

341. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29.
342. See, e.g., Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 121 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Bancorp considerations are largely determinative of a district court's vacatur decision).
343. See, e.g., Marseilles, 481 F.3d at 1003 (stating that district courts are not "cabined by
[Bancorp's] exceptional circumstances test"); Am. Games, 142 F.3d at 1169 (stating that the
district court could have vacated its own judgment without using the exceptional circumstances
test).
344. In patent cases, the general rule is that Federal Circuit law governs substantive patent
law issues and regional circuit law governs procedural issues. See GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp.,
265 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Yet the Federal Circuit has created an exception for
procedural questions that are "intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of the patent
right," id., and applies its own law in those situations. See Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus.,
Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit has yet to resolve the question
whether vacatur is "intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of the patent right," so it
is unclear whether regional circuit law or Federal Circuit law applies to vacatur motions in
patent cases.
345. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

346. Id.
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motions are usually successful. 347 In a good number of cases, Judge
Dyk's concurrence was cited in connection with a request for
settlement-related vacatur. 348 Other courts were likely influenced by
Judge Dyk's concurrence, even if his decision was not cited
explicitly.349
The Federal Circuit also facilitates vacatur with respect to
cases that settle on appeal by remanding them to the trial court for
the limited purpose of deciding the motion to vacate. This longstanding practice, which is documented in a series of unpublished
opinions,350 went unchecked until the Federal Circuit's recent
published decision in Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc. 351 The
parties in Ohio Willow settled on appeal, and per its usual practice,
the Federal Circuit remanded so the district court could consider
whether to vacate the invalidity judgment. What sets Ohio Willow
apart, other than being published, is the concurrence from Judge
Moore, which argues that Bancorp applies to district courts and warns
against the dangers to the public created by vacatur in patent cases. 352
It seemed initially that Judge Moore's concurrence would carry
some weight with district courts deciding vacatur motions in patent
cases. Indeed, in Ohio Willow itself, the district court on remand
denied the motion to vacate in light of the factors set out in
Bancorp.353 Other indicators, however, suggest that Judge Moore is an
outlier on this issue and that the Federal Circuit will continue to
347. Bock, supra note 217, at 234.
348. See, e.g., Triquint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Tech. Ltd., No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT,
2012 WL 1768084, at *1 (D. Az. May 17, 2012) (citing Judge Dyk's concurrence); Lycos, Inc. v.
Blockbuster, Inc., No. 07-11469-MLW, 2010 WL 5437226, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing
Judge Dyk's concurrence); see also Bock, supra note 217, at 931 (stating that Judge Dyk's
concurrence was cited in at least sixteen motions out of seventy-nine cases and in two orders
granting vacatur).
349. Trial courts granting vacatur in patent cases may also be swayed by Erickson v.
Interdigital Commc'ns Corp., 418 F.3d 1217, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005), in which the Federal Circuit
held that a district court abused its discretion by allowing a third party to intervene in a patent
case in order to reinstate previously vacated rulings.
350. See, e.g., Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., No. 2010-1056, 2010 WML 8357170,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2010) (remanding case to allow the district court to consider granting
the parties' motion for vacatur); Taurus IP, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2008-1475, 2008 WL
5737018, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2008) ("The usual course, when the parties have settled, is to
dismiss the appeal unless the parties request that the case be remanded so that the trial court
can consider whether to vacate its own decision due to settlement."); Conmed Corp. v. Erbe
Electromedizen, No. 04-1261, 2004 WML 1531451, *1 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2004) (remanding case to
allow the district court to consider the parties' motion to vacate).
351. 629 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
352. Id. at 1376 (arguing that the public's interest in patent cases is "overwhelming"
especially when the patent has been invalidated). Judge Newman also wrote a concurrence
intended to limit the impact of Judge Moore's opinion. Id. at 1375-76.
353. 769 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
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facilitate vacatur because of its positive influence on settlement
outcomes. For one, in the short time following Ohio Willow, the
Federal Circuit on several occasions has remanded patent cases to the
district court to consider a settlement-related vacatur motion without
mention of Judge Moore's concerns expressed in Ohio Willow. 35 4
Perhaps even more revealing are the vacatur-related policies
and practices of the Federal Circuit's mandatory mediation program.
Recent anecdotal evidence demonstrates that Federal Circuit
mediators sometimes advise parties to seek vacatur as a means of
facilitating settlement in patent cases.355 That this practice is
becoming the rule rather than the exception is substantiated by the
fact that the Federal Circuit's mediation guidelines, which were
originally silent as to vacatur, were amended in September 2012 and
December 2013 to specifically contemplate vacatur as a term of
settlement.356 In fact, in what appears to be a direct response to Judge
Moore's concurrence in Ohio Willow, the mediation guidelines now
require any remand order by the Federal Circuit to include the
following statement: "In remanding this case to the District Court to
consider the motion for vacatur, the Federal Circuit takes no position
as to whether the District Court should grant the motion for
vacatur."35 7
In the end, Ohio Willow did little to dampen the Federal
Circuit's enthusiasm for settlement-related vacatur, even though this
practice squarely contravenes the public's interest in eliminating
suspect patents.
354. Resqnet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., Nos. 2012-1189, 2012-1190, 2012 WL 4171262, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2012); Karl Storz Imaging, Inc. v. Pointe Conception Med., Inc., No. 20121001, 2012 WL 2884704, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2012); Acoustic Techs., Inc. v. Itron, Inc., No.
2011-1315, 2011 WL 3893811, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2011); Duncan Kitchen Grips, Inc. v. Bos.
Warehouse Trading Corp., No. 2011-1321, 2011 WL 3893813, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2011);
Dicam, Inc. v. Cellco, No. 2011-1034, 2011 WL 1252250, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2011).
355. See Response in Opposition Regarding Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief at
10-11, Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-CV-271 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2011) (No.
336) ("[The settlement would not have been reached without the efforts of the Chief Federal
Circuit Mediator and his suggestion of the motion for vacatur to facilitate the settlement."); see
also Bock, supra note 217, at 933 (discussing mediators' practice of recommending vacatur).
356. Compare U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT, APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM

GUIDELINES (effective May 1, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/QQJ3-AEAZ (omitting any
discussion of vacatur as a term of settlement), with U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT,
APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES (amended Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.cafe.uscourts.gov/mediation/guidelines.html (contemplating vacatur as a term of
settlement).
357. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT, AMENDMENTS TO U.S. CoURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES (Dec. 6, 2013), available at

http://perma.cclD6BN-JSWG (stating that the "Federal Circuit takes no position as to whether
the District Court should grant the motion for vacatur").
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3. Personal Jurisdiction
Though personal jurisdiction ostensibly has nothing to do with
settlement, the Federal Circuit has managed to link these two
doctrines with respect to patent declaratory judgment actions. 358 In a
long line of cases, the Federal Circuit has held that patent owners will
not be subject to personal jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions
based exclusively on the sending of a cease-and-desist (or demand)
letter to the accused infringer in the forum state. 359 Unlike most
dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction, the problem identified by
the Federal Circuit has nothing to do with the defendant's lack of
minimum contacts. Just the opposite: the Federal Circuit concedes
that the sending of a cease-and-desist letter would normally give rise
to specific jurisdiction because the patent owner purposefully availed
itself to the forum state by directing the letter there and because the
letter gave rise to the plaintiffs claim.360
So why has the Federal Circuit adopted a rule precluding
jurisdiction in these circumstances? Because, at least in theory, it
encourages settlement. The Federal Circuit has explained that basing
personal jurisdiction on cease-and-desist letters would discourage
patent owners from sending these letters and thus stifle the
settlement of patent disputes-a policy the Federal Circuit deems
"manifest."36 1 In establishing this bright-line rule, which has hardly
been questioned since its adoption more than fifteen years ago, the
Federal Circuit presumes that settlement of patent litigation promotes
the public good. 362 But as I've argued here and in previous work,
358. The Federal Circuit applies its own law to questions of personal jurisdiction in patent
cases because it has determined that personal jurisdiction is "intimately linked to patent law."
See Silent Drive, Inc., v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed Cir. 2003); see also supra
note 344 (discussing the Federal Circuit's choice-of-law analysis in patent cases).
359. See Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that "a
patentee's act of sending letters to another state claiming infringement. . . is not sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction in that state."); Silent Drive, 326 F.3d at 1202 (stating that "the
sending of letters threatening infringement litigation is not sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction."); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (stating that the sending of cease-and-desist letters is not sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction).
360. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(conceding that one would expect the letters to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction);
Silent Drive, 326 F.3d at 1202 (conceding that cease-and-desist letters are purposefully directed
at the forum state); see also Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation,PersonalJurisdiction,and the
Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 82-95 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional analysis contradicts Supreme Court precedent).
361. Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 1361.
362. Id.; La Belle, supra note 153, at 85 (stating that lower courts have reflexively applied
this rule).
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patent settlements sometimes contravene the public interest,
especially when the patent at issue is actually invalid. 363 Be that as it
may, the Federal Circuit has continued to apply this rule and has even
expanded it in recent years to make it more difficult for accused
infringers to affirmatively challenge patents in federal court. 364
Recent developments suggest that the time may be ripe to
reconsider this rule. In the context of the current legislative effort to
curb abusive patent litigation, the use of demand letters has come
under attack. The proposed Innovation Act, for instance, provides that
"it is an abuse of the patent system and against public policy for a
party to send out purposely evasive demand letters to end users
alleging patent infringement." 365 Senate Bill 1720 goes even further,
providing that the widespread sending of demand letters may
constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 36 6 And it's not just the federal government
probing patent owners' use of cease-and-desist letters; many states are
as well. The attorneys general of Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, and
Vermont have used state consumer-protection laws to combat patent
demand-letter campaigns, and Vermont has passed legislation that
provides a private cause of action for businesses receiving a demand
letter. 367 In light of the shifting sentiments about the value of these
types of letters, the Federal Circuit's personal jurisdiction doctrine
appears all the more troubling.
4. Discovery of Settlement Negotiations
A final example of the Federal Circuit's prosettlement
jurisprudence in the patent arena relates to discovery. 368 As a matter
of course in patent litigation, accused infringers seek to discover
settlement negotiation materials relating to the patent owner's
363. See supra Part IV (exploring the normative implications of patent settlements); La
Belle, supra note 360, at 86-90 (demonstrating weaknesses of promotion of settlement
justification for Federal Circuit's personal jurisdiction rule).
364. See La Belle, supra note 153, at 86-93.
365. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 299A(e) (2013).
366. Patent Transparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 299B(b) (2013).

367. See Tony Dutra, NY Agrees to Terms with Patent Troll MPHJ, Firm Fights Back with
Lawsuit Against FTC, http://perma.cclYDX9-DQAU (bna.com, archived Feb. 2, 2014); Ashby
Jones, New York State Cracks Down on Patent Trolls, http://perma.cc/C94D-SBYR (wsj.com,
archived Feb. 2, 2014); Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont Could Save the Nation from Patent Trolls,
http://perma.cc/7JCH-Z7C7 (washingtonpost.com, archived Feb. 2, 2014).
368. As with personal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has held that its law governs
discovery matters in patent cases if the materials subject to discovery relate to an issue of
substantive patent law. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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settlement of prior lawsuits involving similar technology.3 69 It is well
settled that such information is relevant, as it is germane to the
damages analysis in patent suits.370 A good argument can also be
made that settlement negotiations may be relevant to the underlying
merits of patent suits, 3 71 as well as to requests for injunctive relief.3 72
Nevertheless, in a recently decided case, the Federal Circuit
was asked to declare settlement negotiations privileged and thus
immune from discovery. The argument was that this privilege would
"protect the sanctity of settlement discussions and promote the
compromise and settlement of dispute."373 While the Federal Circuit
declined to fashion a new privilege, it held that "other effective
methods" could be used to achieve those important ends. 374 Above all,
the court encouraged trial judges to exercise their broad discretion
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit the scope and
extent of discovery that might otherwise "undermine important
interests in confidentiality," including prior settlements.375
Simply put, patent cases settle because everyone involved
usually wants them to settle. The patent owner wants to settle in
order to protect its patent vis-A-vis other competitors. The accused
infringer wants (or is forced) to settle because adjudicating the case to
judgment is too risky and expensive. And the court wants the parties
to settle because patent cases, even more than other types of complex
civil litigation, are time consuming, burdensome, and difficult. Under
these circumstances, settlement might seem to make good sense. But
the fundamental flaw with our current system is its failure to
369. See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869-72 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(showing that, in litigation, an accused infringer sought discovery of a patent owner's settlement
of prior infringement lawsuits).
370. See, e.g., id. at 869-73 (holding that prior licenses are relevant to calculating reasonable
royalty damages in patent suits).
371. See, e.g., Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that
willingness to license patented invention is objective evidence related to obviousness analysis).
372. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 11-1846-LHK (PSG), at *2-4 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (order granting motion to compel depositions and settlement agreement), available at
http://perma.cc/MVP2-B8U4 (finding Apple's settlement with HTC relevant to request for
permanent injunctive relief against Samsung).
373. In re MSTG, Inc., 675 F.3d 1337, 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Wayne D. Brazil,

Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 985 (1988)
("[C]ourts that admit evidence from settlement negotiations discourage communication about
settlement and impair the rationality of settlement discussions, and thus help to defeat the
policy of encouraging consensual resolution of disputes.").
374. MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1346.
375. Id. at 1347; see also Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc. 265 F.3d
1294, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[W~e are mindful ... of the policy in favor of protecting
settlement negotiations from being admitted as evidence, thus serving to encourage
settlements.").
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safeguard the public interest. The remainder of this Article provides a
solution to that problem.
VI. FOR ADJUDICATION OF SOME PATENT CASES

"[P]opular wisdom is that ... settlement is a good thing." 76
Yet, when it comes to patent settlements, the timeworn adage that
there can be too much of a good thing rings true. Patent settlements
may serve the interests of the parties and the courts in the short term,
but their long-term effects on the public are alarming. For years, this
preference for settlement over adjudication has gone virtually
unchecked. 377 What follows is my proposal for fixing our broken
system of settling patent disputes.
A. Trial Courts as Protectorsof the PublicInterest
Although patent settlements are fraught with problems, 378 the
principal shortcoming in my view is their failure to protect the public's
interest in the patent system. If a patent is invalid, the public is
generally better served by the case being litigated to judgment so that
competitors can enter the market sooner than if the case settles and
the patent remains intact. 379 Similarly, litigating to judgment will
curb repeat patent litigation, which has contributed significantly to
the expanding patent dockets of federal courts. 380 Indeed, as will be
discussed further below, if patent owners believed their lawsuits
would proceed to a final judgment, fewer lawsuits arguably would be
filed in the first place.3 81 Easing burdens on federal courts in these
ways would redound to the benefit of the public.
But who will protect this public interest? I think it is safe to
say that private parties will not. Patent owners do not want their
patents invalidated, and accused infringers often choose to settle, not
only because of the high cost of litigation but also because of the
376. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that
settlement is ordinarily thought of as "a good thing"); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1341.
377. The Supreme Court's recent Actavis decision provides for an antitrust check on reverse
payment settlements, but not for the types of standard patent settlements that are the subject of
this Article. 133 S. Ct. at 2233.
378. See supra Part IV (exploring the many problems associated with patent settlements).
379. See supra Part IV.A (showing that the public's interest in the patent system is

paramount).
380. See Allison et al., supra note 14, at 677 (finding that repeat patent litigants are often
unsuccessful at trial).

381. See Luban, supra note 62, at 2640 (explaining that, in a world without settlement, "we
should expect fewer lawsuits to be filed").
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free rider problem associated with patent challenges. 382 Even if the
current reform efforts result in lower litigation costs in patent cases,
many accused infringers would still opt to settle-the only difference
being they could settle for less money because the possibility of
recovering attorneys' fees would provide greater leverage in
settlement negotiations. So we can't rely on the parties to protect the
public interest, but what about organizations such as the Public
Patent Foundation383 and Public Knowledge? 384 In theory, these public
interest organizations would be very good candidates, except that
their ability to challenge patents in federal courts is severely limited
by Article III standing requirements. 385 Nor is there a neutral third
party representing the public in patent litigation as there is in
International Trade Commission proceedings, meaning the public
interest is left unguarded. 386
This leaves trial judges to function as protectors of the public
interest in patent cases. Trial judges are the logical choice for several
reasons. First, the vast majority of patent cases are settled at the
initial stage of litigation (as opposed to on appeal), so if the goal is to
limit patent settlements, the focus must be on district court
proceedings. Second, trial judges are well positioned to assess the

382. See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, Antitrust Pitfalls in Patent Litigation Settlement
Agreements, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 113, 114 (1998) ("When an alleged infringer decides that it is in his
interest to settle a patent infringement litigation against him, his entire business outlook
changes. Where before he wanted the patent held invalid, he now may want the patent held valid
so that the patent owner can assert it against his competitors.").
383. The Public Patent Foundation is a nonprofit "legal services organization whose mission
is to protect freedom in the patent system." About PubPat, http://perma.cc/K4TE-5ENP
(pubpat.org, archived Feb. 2, 2014).
384. Public Knowledge is a public interest organization whose mission includes "uphold[ing]
and protect[ing] the rights of consumers to use innovative technology lawfully." Mission
Statement, http://perma.cc/F7E-6F48 (publicknowledge.org, archived Feb. 2, 2014).
385. La Belle, supra note 153, at 77-82 (canvassing the Federal Circuit's case law regarding
standing in patent declaratory judgment actions). Public interest organizations are able to bring
postgrant administrative challenges to the PTO, and the AIA provides that any party dissatisfied
by the PTO's decision may appeal to the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329 (2011). In a
recent case, however, the Federal Circuit raised the question whether the appellant-a public
interest organization-has Article III standing to appeal the PTO's adverse validity decision. See
Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., No. 2013-1377 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Oral
argument in the case was held late last year, after which the Federal Circuit invited the PTO
and the United States to weigh in on the standing question. On January 17, 2014, the
government filed its brief in which it takes the position that appellant Consumer Watchdog lacks
Article III standing to appeal the PTO's decision. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, No. 2013-1377 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2014). If the Federal Circuit agrees with the
government, public interest organizations and the consumers they represent will be further
disenfranchised by these restraints on their ability to participate in the patent system.
386. See Bock, supra note 178 (manuscript at 1) (proposing the addition of third-party
neutrals to patent litigation in federal court).
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parties, facts, patents, and technology involved in the suit, and when
appropriate, they can appoint special masters to assist with that
effort. 387 Last, and perhaps most important, trial judges are regularly
called upon to consider the public interest for other inquires related to
patent law, such as preliminary and permanent injunctions, patent
misuse, and laches. 388 Also, more generally, judges consider the public
interest in the context of class action lawsuits. 389 So federal judges
should already be fairly comfortable in this role as defenders of the
public good.
B. Identifying Patent Cases that Should Be Adjudicated
Let's say district judges eagerly assume this new role. The next
step is separating patent cases that should be adjudicated from those
that should be settled. This will not be an easy task, but there are
some patent cases that stand out as leading contenders for the
adjudication track because their impact is felt by many more than just
the litigants before the court. The first would be "repeat patent suits,"
and by that I mean cases involving patents that have previously been
asserted or are concurrently being asserted against other parties in
other suits. Adjudicating these repeat patent suits could yield
immediate, palpable benefits, because if the patent is invalidated, the
previously protected technology may fall into the public domain, and
the patent owner will be estopped from asserting the patent again. 390
Judge Moore addressed this in her Ohio Willow concurrence:
In this case ... the patentee has already sued another party on the patent in question.
If the decision that invalidated the patent at issue is not vacated, then the patentee will
be collaterally estopped from asserting this patent in this and other suits, thereby

387. See e.g., Josh Hartman & Rachel Krevans, Counsel Courts Keep: JudicialReliance on
Special Masters, Court-Appointed Experts, and Technical Advisors in Patent Cases, 14 SEDONA
CONF. J. 61 (2013).
388. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (listing public
interest as one of the factors in deciding whether to grant permanent injunctive relief); A.C.
Auckerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1046-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting
public policy concerns in a laches analysis); In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract
Litig., 850 F. Supp. 769, 772 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (explaining that patent misuse considers the
"public's interest in assuring that a patentee does not extend his patent beyond the statutory
monopoly he has been granted").
389. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (providing that class action settlements are subject to the trial
court's approval).
390. See, e.g., Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J., concurring) (explaining that invalidation will collaterally estop the patentee
from asserting the patent in this and other suits); see also supra note 161 (discussing how
blocking patents might prevent the technology from entering the public domain even when a
patent has been invalidated).
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saving courts and litigants the time and money it takes to proceed with patent
39 1
litigation.

The Lemley study, discussed above in Part III.B, lends further support
to this recommendation. Its finding-that the most litigated patents
are more likely to be invalidated upon adjudication than patents
litigated one time-supports repeat patent suits being adjudicated. 392
A second class of patent cases that we should seriously consider
for adjudication would be those involving so-called standards-essential
patents. These patents have been declared as essential to
implementing some technological standard, so that anyone who adopts
the standard potentially infringes the patent. 393 Although standardsessential patents are to be licensed on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") terms, there is often disagreement
about what FRAND requires and whether a declared patent is
actually essential to a given standard.394 If litigation ensues, this is
exactly the type of case that ought to be adjudicated, because
invalidation of the patent would release all who adopted the standard
of any obligation to pay licensing fees. 395
The third category of patent cases that judges should steer
toward adjudication may be more elusive to identify. These are what I
call "important" patent cases, which are cases that will impact the
public in some significant way. One reason a patent case may be
important is because it implicates public health or safety. The Ass'n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. case, in which the
ACLU challenged certain gene patents related to breast cancer, is a
good example. 396 Alternatively, a case may be deemed important
because the accused product is highly popular, so injunctive relief

391. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 629 F.3d at 1376.
392. See Allison et al., supra note 14, at 687 (finding that, of 1,134 results, 343 were
outcomes from patents litigated a single time and the rest were outcomes from the most litigated
patents); see also supra Part III.B (explaining Allison et al.'s findings).
393. See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 50-52 (2013); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting,
Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351,
371 (2007).
394. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (first U.S. court to determine RAND terms for a standards-essential
patent); Doug Lichtman, Understandingthe RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1031
(2010) (describing the lack of guidance offered by the language of the RAND commitment as
"something of an outrage").
395. See Love, supra note 185, at n.126 (stating that invalidation of a licensed patent frees
the licensees from having to pay royalties).
396. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). In Myriad, the Supreme Court unanimously held that isolated
human genes are not patentable subject matter under § 101. Id. at 2116-19.
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would directly affect a large group of consumers. 397 Finally, a case that
raises a critical yet unresolved question of patent law could also fall
into this "important" category. Because the question whether a patent
case is sufficiently important to warrant adjudication may be
nebulous, district courts should look for signals like amicus briefs and
media attention, 398 or perhaps seek guidance from a special master or
expert. 399 Ideally, over time, the Federal Circuit would provide
guidance to lower courts in identifying important cases for
adjudication.
C. What Trial Courts Can Do to EncourageAdjudication
Once the district court identifies a case that should be
adjudicated, the ultimate question is what, if anything, can the judge
do about it? It is true that preventing private parties from settling
may be challenging, yet there are steps for courts to take. While I offer
suggestions here-some modest, others more wide-ranging-they are
by no means intended to be exhaustive.
Starting small, the first thing courts can do to encourage
adjudication of patent cases is to stop pressuring parties to settle.
There are litigants who want to go to trial, and courts ought to let
them. 400 Along those same lines, district courts should stop granting
settlement-related vacatur motions. Courts are currently granting
these motions almost 80% of the time, which is far too often. 401 If
patentees had to live with invalidity judgments and unfavorable claim
construction rulings, there would be fewer settlements.

397. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (accusing the
popular Android smartphone of infringement); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (accusing the popular BlackBerry device of infringement). Of course, there
is a potential downside to adjudicating these cases if the patent owner prevails and secures an
injunction that could directly affect a large number of consumers. While a real risk, I believe it's
one worth taking in many cases, especially seeing how district courts post-eBay consider the
public's interest in deciding whether to grant and how to fashion permanent injunctive relief.
See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that
injunction was narrowly tailored to minimize harm to public), rev'd on other grounds, 598 F.3d
831 (2010).
398. In the Myriad case, for example, a number of amicus briefs were filed at the district
court stage of the litigation. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 190-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting the various amici in the case).
399. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing the use of special masters in
patent cases).
400. See supra Part V.A (explaining how Apple and others have been heavily pressured by
courts to settle their patent disputes).
401. See Bock, supra note 217, at 956-57 (finding through empirical research that vacatur
was granted in an overwhelming majority of cases).
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Courts willing to be a bit more assertive have other items in
the judicial toolbox for encouraging adjudication. Like Judge Davis in
the Eastern District of Texas, judges can modify deadlines and
disclosure requirements to relieve some of the pressure that leads to
premature settlement. 402 Depending on the case's scope, the
requirements under local patent rules may be unreasonable and
illogical. For instance, some local rules require invalidity contentions
to be developed, prepared, and disclosed in a very short amount of
time, forcing accused infringers to "scour the earth" for prior art right
at the start of the lawsuit. 4 0 3 If an accused infringer is unable to
identify relevant prior art in that brief time frame, the case may very
well settle. Yet with more flexible deadlines from the court, there is a
better chance the defendant will uncover prior art that invalidates the
patent. 404
Another option is for the trial court to invite amici to
participate in patent cases it believes should be adjudicated. 405 Amici
may participate at all levels of federal litigation, including the district
court. 4 0 6 Even in patent cases with capable counsel, amici can provide
valuable assistance to the court and the parties. The court might look
to amici for expertise on the patented technology or to weigh in on the
implications for the public. 407 Amici could simultaneously support the
parties, specifically accused infringers in their efforts to uncover
relevant prior art and prove the patent invalid.
Trial courts could also rely on their fee-shifting authority to
push certain patent cases toward adjudication. The Patent Act
permits courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party in "exceptional cases." 4 08 If courts exercised this power more
freely and more often, accused infringers might be more willing to go
to trial for a chance at invalidating the patent. And while courts
historically have been reluctant to shift fees in patent cases, that
402. See supra Part V.B (discussing Judge Davis's approach to settlement in patent cases).
403. James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the
Northern District of California'sPatent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 965, 1005 (2009).
404. See, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[There
is virtually always 'pertinent' and 'relevant' art apparently unconsidered in the PTO and
available to a patent challenger.").
405. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question
of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 692-93 (2011) (explaining that district court invited
amicus briefs from public interest organizations, academics, and public defenders).
406. Michele Estrin Gilman, Litigating Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 131, 151 (2007).
407. See id. (noting that amici may provide background information or particular expertise).
408. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
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trend may be changing. In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. 02 Micro
International, Ltd., for example, the Federal Circuit affirmed a
$9 million award of attorneys' fees to the accused infringer based on
the patent owner's litigation misconduct. 409 Moreover, the Chief Judge
of the Federal Circuit wrote an op-ed in the New York Times last year
urging trial judges to use their fee-shifting authority to prevent patent
owners from "bully[ing] . . . defendant[s]

into settling."410 Finally,

Congress and the Supreme Court have both taken up the issue of
attorneys' fees in patent cases. As discussed earlier, the House has
passed and the Senate is considering legislation that would imbue the
courts with greater fee-shifting authority. 411 Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in two cases involving the patent feeshifting statute, which together challenge the Federal Circuit's
substantive standard and standard of review for an "exceptional case"
finding under section 285 of the Patent Act. 4 1 2 Thus, in the current
climate, fee shifting may actually be a viable option for trial courts
hoping to encourage adjudication of some patent cases.
My last two suggestions are somewhat more radical. The first
is that trial judges should use preliminary judgments to promote
adjudication of appropriate patent cases. 413 A preliminary judgment is
a "tentative assessment of the merits of a case or any part of a case,
based on the same sorts of information that the courts already
consider on motions for summary judgment."414 Preliminary
judgments could serve various salutary functions in patent cases, such
as signaling to accused infringers the court's view on the patent's
validity.415 Take, for instance, a case where the trial judge has serious
doubts about the patent based on the defendant's invalidity
contentions or some other information. If the judge issues a
preliminary judgment invalidating the patent, that may be enough to

409. 726 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

410. Randall R. Rader et al., Making Patent Trolls Pay in Court, http://perma.cc/5R8K-F6G6
(nytimes.com, archived Feb. 2, 2014).
411. See infra Part III.B (discussing Congressional efforts to pass legislation to curb patent
litigation abuse).
412. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted, No. 12-1184, 2013 WL 1283843, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013); Highmark, Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-1163, 2013
WL 1217353, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013).
413. Miller, supra note 243, at 165 (proposing the use of preliminary judgments in civil
cases).
414. Id. at 167.
415. Id. at 168 (arguing that preliminary judgments "would provide litigants with a highly
credible evaluation of the case, made by a person with the capacity to determine (or, in the case
of a jury trial, at least influence) the outcome").
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steer the accused infringer away from settlement and toward
adjudication-especially if the court also indicates its willingness to
award attorneys' fees.
Finally, patent cases could be treated as "quasi-class actions"
thereby imbuing judges with broader powers, including the authority
to approve (or disapprove) of any settlement. 416 The quasi-class action
is a judicial creation that has been utilized by some federal courts in
recent years, especially in mass-tort multidistrict litigations
("MDLs"). 4 17 These courts essentially treat MDLs as class actions, on
the premise that mass litigation possesses many of the characteristics
of class actions. 418 Though scholars have questioned the legitimacy of
quasi-class action practice, it is undeniable that at least some courts
have embraced it.419 Moreover, MDL patent practice has grown
recently because of the joinder provisions in the America Invents Act,
which make it more difficult for patent owners to join multiple
defendants in a single suit.420 So perhaps judges in these patent MDLs
could exercise their equitable powers to disapprove of settlements not
in the public's best interest.421
These are just a few suggestions for how trial judges might
encourage adjudication of certain patent cases. The fact is that federal
courts have broad discretion to manage cases in a way that secures
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."422
416. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-DistrictLitigations:Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 114 (2010)
(discussing the judicial powers associated with class actions).
417. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009) (noting
that an MDL is distinct from a class action but similar enough to warrant treatment as a
quasi-class action); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(noting that the 30,000 cases brought against Eli Lilly & Company had been administered as a
quasi-class action).
418. See Silver & Miller, supra note 416, at 110-11 (explaining that a judge presiding over
an MDL has the same broad powers as one presiding over a class action, including appointment
of lead attorneys and control of their compensation, forced fee transfers, and fee cuts).
419. See id. (noting that "several judges have recently ruled that MDLs are
'quasi-class actions' "); Linda Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-ClassAction, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 389, 389 (2012) (arguing that "there is no such thing as a quasi-class actions").

420. See Daniel J. Schwartz, Leveraging Strategies and Scheduling Complexities in Patent
Cases to Design Successful Infringement Defenses, 2013 WL 574400, at *2 (2013) (explaining the
new joinder provisions in the AIA); see also supranote 276 (discussing AIA joinder provisions).
421. For example, judges could refuse to approve patent settlements conditioned on vacatur
or settlements including no-challenge provisions. See supra Part V (demonstrating the negative
impact these practices have on the public).
422. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How

Pre-DismissalDiscovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 107 (2010) (explaining that "courts may exercise their broad
discretion to grant discovery and manage their cases in such a way as to serve the goals of justice
and efficiency").
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Up to now, courts have used this power to facilitate settlement in
patent litigation, presumably because that provided for a "speedy and
inexpensive" end to the case. Going forward, however, courts should be
equally concerned with exercising discretion in a way that ensures just
resolution of patent cases. The question addressed in the penultimate
Part of this Article is whether courts can strive for justice without
compromising these other important values.
VII. MORE ADJUDICATION, LESS LITIGATION

Critics are likely to object to my proposal on the ground that it
will create more work and more expense for our already overburdened
federal courts. Conventional wisdom says that patent litigation is too
expensive, too unwieldy, and too unpredictable. We heard that time
and again as Congress discussed, debated, and finally passed the
AIA. 4 23 Thus, objectors will argue, a proposal that advocates for more
litigation is impractical and unwise. While it may be true that my
proposal will increase litigation in the immediate term, the long-range
view suggests that more adjudication will actually reduce patent
litigation in federal courts.
There are two reasons why that is so. First, as has been
discussed throughout this Article, adjudication will reduce repeat
patent suits, which account for a significant percentage of patent
litigation filed in federal courts today. 424 If the patent is adjudged
invalid, the patent owner will be precluded from ever asserting the
patent again. 425 However, even if the patent is upheld, that could
reduce future litigation because accused infringers may be more
willing to license a patent that has withstood a prior validity
challenge. 426
Second, many patent owners view litigation simply as a
settlement mechanism and have no intention of pursuing their cases
423. See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. H3457 (Mar. 11, 2009) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith)
(arguing the negative attributes of patent litigation).
424. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 14, at 682 & n.23 (finding that the most litigated
patents had been asserted in almost 500 separate suits). It is worth noting that the Lemley study
defines "most litigated patents" as those that were the subject of eight or more lawsuits in the
relevant time period. Id. at 682. That means that there are far more than 500 repeat patent suits
where the patent has been asserted in two to seven separate litigations.
425. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(allowing petitioner to amend pleading to assert a plea of estoppel).
426. See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Litigationof FinancialInnovations, 53 J.L. & EcON. 807, 816
(2010) (explaining that patentee was able to license its patent to Bank of America, CapitalOne,
and other major credit card providers after the patent withstood a validity challenge); Lee
Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 176 (2006) ("[I]f competitors believe that a
patent is likely not valid, they are less likely to take a license to that patent.").
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to judgment. 427 This strategy has been successful under our current
system because patent owners are able to settle quickly,
inexpensively, and without posing any real risk to their patents. But if
courts begin encouraging adjudication of some patent cases instead of
settlement, the effect over time would be to dissuade patent owners
from initiating litigation. 428 In other words, more adjudication would
actually mean less litigation, because the greater risk of invalidation
and higher costs of adjudication would frequently outweigh the
benefits of filing suit. 42 9
VIII. CONCLUSION

"We live in a world of settlements, it is true, but all is not right
with this world."4 30 These words, written by Professor Geoffrey Miller,
should resonate with those concerned about the current state of our
patent litigation system. It is true that patent litigation can be timeconsuming, expensive, and unpredictable, but as this Article has
shown, settlement is not always the solution. Instead, settlement
poses real harm to the public's interest, as Owen Fiss and other critics
have argued. In the patent context, settlements are especially
dangerous because they leave potentially invalid patents intact,
thwarting competition and increasing prices without benefiting society
in any way.
Some patent cases ought to be adjudicated, particularly those
whose impact will be felt far beyond the four walls of the courtroom.
More adjudication will benefit the public by eradicating bad patents
and by reducing over time the number of patent cases filed in federal
court. While it will not always be easy to identify the patent cases that
should be adjudicated, trial judges, as guardians of the public interest,
are well situated to make these decisions. Trial judges also have the
broad discretion necessary to implement this proposal and to influence
patent litigation outcomes in pursuit of justice.

427. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 312 (concluding as a result that "any proposed
change in the patent laws should be analyzed in terms of the incentives generated for prompt
settlement of patent disputes").
428. See Luban, supra note 62, at 2640 (positing that in a world without settlement, "we
should expect fewer lawsuits to be filed"); see also FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2247 (2013)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision to reject certain reverse payment
settlements "may very well discourage" litigation in the first place).
429. See, e.g., James Farrand et al., "Heform"Arrives in Patent Enforcement. The Big Picture,
51 IDEA 357, 440 (2011) ("[The increased risk of invalidation influences bargaining power,
licensing negotiations, litigation decisions, and settlement proposals.").
430. Miller, supra note 243, at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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